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MAJOR DISPUTES UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
By A.

J. HARPER Ilt

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background And Legislative History

T

HE Railway Labor Act (hereinafter "RLA" or "Act")' is the cummulation of over fifty years of experimental legislation concerning
labor-management relations on railroads.! In 1936 Congress passed Title
II of the Act, which extended coverage to the airline industry!
In 1934, the Act was amended to eradicate several shortcomings of the
original 1926 Act. The most important creation of the 1934 amendment
was section 2, Ninth providing a means for the resolution of representational disputes. The reasons for the extension of the Act, in 1936, to the
airline industry were varied. Among them, the following seem to have
been controlling: (1) By 1936 almost all aspects of air transportation were
regulated and this was deemed evidence of a strong public interest in this
field which was sufficient to overcome any Congressional doubts as to
whether labor should also be regulated;4 (2) At the time of passage of
the Act, it was contemplated that the airlines would be placed under ICC
jurisdiction, and, hence, there was a feeling that uniformity could be
achieved by placing airlines under the same labor act as existed for the
railroads;' (3) The airline industry, charged with public responsibility,
needed experienced and detailed labor regulation which only the RLA
could provide, and there was a crying need for legislation of some sort
due to the depression and consequent labor unrest;' and (4) At the time
of the hearings on the Act, the Wagner Act had not yet passed the House,
and there was a good deal of skepticism as to its constitutionality."
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) was the leading proponent of
Title II before Congress The desire of the pilots for a craft type organitLL.B., Cum Laude, 1967, Southern Methodist University School of Law; Member of State
Bar of Texas; Associate, Law Firm of Fulbright, Crooker, Freeman, Bates & Jaworski, Houston,
Texas.
1 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C." SS 151-88 (1964).
'Among its predecessors were the Erdman Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 424; the Newland Act of
1913, 38 Stat. 103; the Adamson Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 721; and the Transportation Act of 1920.
5
RLA, §§ 201-08, 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1964).
4 See Comment, Airline Labor Policy, The Stepchild of the Railway Labor Act, 1 8 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 461, 461-63 (1951) [hereinafter Airline Labor Policy] and sources therein cited.
5 Id.
6
1d. at 461-62.
7 Id. at 463 n.11. National Labor Relations Act (Hereinafter NLRA), 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-87 (1964).
SId. at 461-63 and sources therein cited. The pilots were probably one of the most effective
lobbying forces in Washington at the time. It was through their efforts that the now-famous National Labor Board Decision No. 83 (under the NIRA) was decided. It is still valid today as a
floor for pilot wages. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401 (k) (1), 72 Stat. 754, as amended,
76 Stat. 143, 49 U.S.C. S 1371(k)(1) (1964).
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zation can be appreciated when it is realized that they are a definite minority of the total number of employees. Airline management did not
even bother to attend the hearings, evidently on the assumption that the

bill would fail as it had done before! At the time of passage of Title II,
there were no collective bargaining agreements in the airline industry, and
ALPA was the only union of any strength. The first labor agreement was
not even signed until 1937,10 and it was not until the late 1940's that the
NMB began considering labor problems and organization in the airline
industry."
B. Structure Of Bargaining Units
Unlike the NLRA where unit organization can take a variety of forms
such as single or multi-plant units, or craft units, or a combination of
both, the RLA is based solely on "craft or class."'" The Act fails, however,
to define this term, and this task has fallen on the NMB. The NMB has
done this through representation disputes under section 2, Ninth.'" The
determination of craft or class, according to the NMB, is but a part of
determining who is to be the collective bargaining representative for the
employees.' The NMB has tended to construe this term narrowly and to
equate the term "class" as tantamount to "craft" which follows the established railroad practice. Had the NMB defined the term "class" more
liberally, many of the criticisms of the Act's application to the airlines
could have been avoided. The craft concept results in a horizontal structure of bargaining units rather than the usual vertical structure common
under the NRLA. As determined by the NMB in representation proceedings this has resulted in seven to nine crafts or classes in the airline industry, all represented by different unions. The NMB has also required systemwide units rather than single plant organization. This also seems to be a
result of the practice on the railroads where system-wide organization has
always been the established form."
This horizontal structure of system-wide units does have some advantages
which make it particularly adaptable to the transportation industries.
Unlike manufacturing companies, the transportation industry is without
any. central "plant" and its employees are spread out among all of the
communities which it services. This would make it difficult to organize
on a vertical type of structure because of the great number of units
which would thereby be created. A large number of units each bargaining
for its particular location would create multiplicity of bargaining and
pose a serious threat to the labor peace. Also, organization on the horizontal level tends to establish 'national uniformity in wages and benefits
'Airline Labor Policy, supra note 4, at 462.
0
" Id. at 464 n.20 & 21.
"See, e.g., NMB Case No. R-1706 (1947). See generally, Comment, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 249
(1966).
12
RLA, § 2, Fourth, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C, § 152, Fourth (1964).
"See generally, Comment, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 249, 251 n.8 (1966).
4
' 1d. See United Transp. Serv. Employees v. NMB, 179 F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir." 1949).
1"Airline Labor Policy, supra note 4, at 472-73.
"See 16 NMB Ann. Rep. 22 (1950).
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among workers performing the same or similar types of labor and with a
similar degree of skill or training, but, of course, absent negotiated adjustm ents, does not provide for differences in the cost of living from locale
to locale.
While these practices of the NMB have been the cause of much criticism, part of which is undoubtedly valid, it should be pointed out that
this criticism is aimed at the NMB's interpretation rather than at the Act
itself. It is the interpretation and application of the craft or class concept rather than the concept itself which has created the complaints. The
NMB has been accused of superimposing the railroad structure onto the
airlines. Examples of this are the placing of stores personnel in the general
clerical craft rather than the mechanics craft with whom they closely
work and by dividing the janitors into two crafts, one mechanics (shop)
and one clerks (office)." This type of division tends to create labor unrest in the form of jurisdictional disputes between unions by splitting
natural occupational groups. In defense of the NMB, it did hold extensive
hearings in the first airline case18 establishing the craft or class units. However, it is hard to deny that the NMB's frame of reference during these
hearings was the railroad industry's structure with which it was familar."
II. ENFORCEMENT
While the Act provides an elaborate procedure for the settlement of
major disputes between the parties," it fails to provide any means of enforcement for the duties it imposes on the parties, except for provisions
added in 1966 providing for enforcement of NRAB awards by the courts."
The only sanction provided is a criminal penalty aimed at the carrier which
has not been used to any great extent." However, the Supreme Court, in
1930, held that the duties of the Act were enforceable in the courts; that
is, compliance with the Act, to prevent either party from violating its
terms, was a judicially enforceable right." This decision was reaffirmed in
1937, in the now famous Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40 case."
In holding that the duty "to treat only with the true representative, and
hence the negative duty to treat with no other" was judicially enforceable, ' the Court went on to hold that the more general provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act' did not control over the more specific provisions
of the Railway Labor Act. This doctrine has subsequently been applied
"
fare,
"
ig
"

See Hearings on S. 3295 Before Subcomm. of Senate Committee on Labor and Public Wel81st Cong., 2d Sess. 219-20 (1950).
See NMB Case No. R-1706 (1947); Comment, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 249, 252 n.14 (1966).
Id.
See Byrer, The Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act-A Comparison, 44

W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1937-38).
2180 Stat. 208 (1966).
22RLA, § 10, 44 Stat. 586, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).
23Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S.Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) (enjoining
the carrier from interfering with employees in the selection of their representative in violation of
5 2, Third).
24300 U.S. 515 (1937). See also Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 721 (1945).
"300 U.S. at 547-49. See also Ruby v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d I1 (2d Cir. 1964).
2629 U.S.C. S 101, especially §§ 4, 7 and 8.
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to unions as well as carriers. Specifically, carriers have been compelled to
bargain,"7 to comply with the commands of the Act in regard to major
disputes, i.e., to hold conferences following a section 6 notice,2 8 and to file
a section 6 notice before instituting changes affecting working conditions.2
Further, carriers have been compelled to refrain from interfering with the
employees' rights to choose a representative without carrier influence or
coercion," and to establish a system board to hear a dispute between it
and the union as required by the Act." Unions have been compelled to
fairly represent all employees within its craft or class without discrimination in addition to complying with the procedures of the Act. 2 In addition, courts have jurisdiction under the Act to declare the duties of the
parties, usually by way of a declaratory judgment suit or a suit for injunctive relief," i.e., the duty to bargain about a particular subject or to
determine the validity of a contract as applied.'
The courts have clearly held that they have power to compel compliance with the procedures of the Act (as distinguished from its substantive
duties) in minor disputes, that is, to compel submission to a system board.'
However, some question seems to exist in the minds of some commentators
(for example Benjamin Aaron) as to whether the courts can use their
injunctive power to prevent resort to self-help by one of the parties prior
to exhaustion of the major disputes procedures. The courts which have
discussed the issue have consistently held that an injunction is available to
prevent one of the parties from resorting to self-help while the Act's
procedures are being followed.
2 See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960); Order
of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1941); Virginian Ry. v. System
Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Railroad Yardmasters v. Pennsylvania R.R., 224 F.2d 226
(3d Cir. 1955); Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Atlantic C.L. R.R., 201 F.2d 36 (4th Cir.
1952).
2"Akron & B.B. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 254 F. Supp. 306 (D.D.C. 1966).
28 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960); Florida E.C. Ry.
v. Brotherhood of Loco .Eng'rs, 362 F.2d 226, 228 (3d Cit. 1965).
aTexas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
31FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 359 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966); Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v.
ALPA, 331 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964); FEIA v. American Airlines,
Inc., 303 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1962).
"Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1951); Graham v. Brotherhood
of Loco. Firemen & Eng'rs, 338 U.S. 232 (1949); Turnstall v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen &
Eng'rs, 323 U.S. 212 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Mount v.
Grand Int'l Bhd. of Loco. Eng'rs, 226 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1955).
aaAkron, C. & Y. R.R. v. Barnes, 215 F.2d 423 (7th Cir.), vacated & remanded to Dist. Ct.
for dismissal pursuant to stipulation of parties, 348 U.S. 893 (1954); Capitol Airways, Inc. v.
ALPA, 7 Av. Cas. 17,165 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); Wooldrige v. Denver & R.G.W. R.R., 118 Colo.
(declaratory judgment suits). In the injunctive suits, one party is
25, 191 P.2d 882 (1948)
claiming no duty exists and the other is seeking to compel compliance. See, e.g., Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
4
See, e.g., Felter v. Southern Pac. Co., 359 U.S. 326 (1959); O'Connell v. Erie Lackawanna
R.R., 391 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1968); McElroy v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 392 F.2d 966 (7th Cir.
1968); Order of Ry. Conductors v. Switchmen's Union, 269 F.2d 726 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 899 (1959); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Smith, 251 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1958);
Mount v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Loco. Eng'rs, 226 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1955) (all involving a question
of validity of a contract as applied); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362
U.S. 330 (1960) (duty to bargain). But cf. Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 331 F.2d 433 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964) (question of existence of contract for system board, not
court).
" FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 359 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966); FEIA v. American Airlines,
Inc., 303 F.2d 5 (5th Cit. 1962).
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[U]nder the Railway Labor Act the status quo is maintained throughout all
of the various steps of negotiation, conciliation, mediation and voluntary
arbitration, and in the event all these agencies and instrumentalities fail, the
the status quo is still further maintained . . . [if a Presidential Emergency
Board is created]."
The question thus becomes whether, during the "cooling off" periods, the
parties can be compelled to maintain'that status quo.

It seems relatively settled, however, that once the procedures established
for the settlement of major disputes are exhausted, the Act contemplates
and allows the parties to resort to self-help; therefore, the proscriptions of
Norris-LaGuardia prevents the issuance of an injunction to prevent such
resort.a" Generally, when the procedures are exhausted, the time period
cannot be restated by a second section 6 notice."a However, there is
authority supporting the view that if the second section 6 notice is unrelated to the first dispute, then a strike can be enjoined, at least where
the strike is obviously over the second dispute."
Also, in the major dispute area, the courts are seemingly without power
to issue an injunction unless the moving party has itself complied with the
Act, the courts using section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to deny
jurisdiction.'
a Byrer, The Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act-A Comparison, 44
W.VA. L.Q. 1, 5 (1937-38).

The purpose of Section 6 is "to prevent rocking of the boat by either
side until the procedure of the Railway Labor Act is exhausted." Manning v. American Airlines,
Inc., 329 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817 (1964). There are three different
descriptions of what must be maintained during the cooling-off periods: (1) after the Section 6
notice is served and until the controversy has been finally acted on by the NMB, there can be no
change in rates of pay, rules or working conditions; (2) for thirty days after mediatory efforts and
offer of arbitration have failed, there can be no change in "rates of pay, rules or working conditions
or established practices"; (3) after an emergency board has been created, and for thirty days
after its report, there can be no change in "the conditions out of which the dispute arose," On
injunctions in major disputes, see generally Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 292, 300-22 (1963); Murphy, Injunctive Prevention of Strikes on Railroads and Airlines,
9 LAB. L.J. 329, 338-42, 350 (1958); Comment, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 381 (1960).
" Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Atlantic C.L. R.R., 362 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.), aff'd by equally divided Court without
opinion, 385 U.S. 20 (1966); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. FEIA, 306 F.2d 840 (2d
Cir. 1962); American Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 169 F.Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). This sword cuts
both ways. In FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 208 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam,
307 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 945 (1963), the court held that the union was
also barred from obtaining injunctive relief once the procedures of the Act had been exhausted.
"To allow a union but not an employer 'self-help' in that situation is a possible but unattractive
result, which stacks the deck heavily in favor of one of the parties to a labor dispute after a
strike has started." 208 F. Supp. at 190. See also Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d
32, 35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817 (1964). It should be noted, however, that there are
limits to the exercise of self-help, at least for the carriers. See Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks
v. Florida E.C. Ry., 348 U.S. 238 (1966).
aPan American World Airways, Inc. v. FEIA, 306 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1962); Continental
Airlines, Inc. v. FEIA, 6 Av. Cas. 18,079 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 185
F. Supp. 77 (D. Minn. 1960); American Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 169 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
" KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. TWU, 8 Av. Cas. 18,395 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Pullman Co. v.
Order of Ry. Conductors, 49 L.R.R.M. 3162 (N.D. II. 1962). See dissent in Pan American World
Airways, Inc. v. FEIA, 306 F.2d 840, 847 (2d Cir. 1962); and dicta in Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. ALPA, 185 F. Supp. 77 (D. Minn. 1960), to the effect that sin'e the second Section 6 notice
did not involve new issues, a strike could not be enjoined.
40See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330. 338 n.39
(1960); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50 (1944); Order of
Ry. Conductors v. Spokane, P.&S. Ry., 336 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1966); Elgin, J.&E. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 302 F.2d 540 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962); Chicago,
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The question has more frequently arisen where one party has resorted
to self-help, or threatens to do so, before exhausting the administrative
procedures of the Act, and the other party seeks to enjoin such action as
a violation of the Act. In dicta in the Burley case,' the Supreme Court
seemingly approved of the injunction to insure compliance with the major
dispute procedures:
[The Act] retains throughout the traditional voluntary processes of negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation. . . .The parties are
required to submit to the successive procedures designed to induce agreement . . . . But compulsions go only to insure that these procedures are
exhausted before resort can be had to self-help.
However, the Court subsequently "muddied the water" in a footnote in
its decision in Chicago River.4 While accommodating Norris-LaGuardia
with the RLA and holding the latter controlling in a minor dispute situation insofar as insuring compliance with the procedures of the Act, the
Court stated:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act has been held to prevent issuance of an injunction
in a railway labor case involving a "major dispute," Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Toledo, P. F5 W. R. Co., 321 U.S. 50. In such case, of course,
the Railway Labor Act does not provide a process for a final decision like
that of the Adjustment Board in a "minor dispute" case.
An examination of the cited Toledo case reveals two important factors.
First, the processes of the Act had been exhausted; and second, there was
no claim by the carrier that the Act had been violated. And, as pointed
4
out by one writer in the field, the footnote was irrelevant to the decision. '
As stated in Chicago, R.I. F Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's Union:" "the injunction in the Toledo P. & W. case had been denied, not because the dispute was 'major' but because § 8 of Norris-LaGuardia prevented issuance
of an injunction. . . ." Section 8 of Norris-LaGuardia embodies the socalled "clean hands doctrine" which has been held to bar a party from the
right to injunctive relief where it had not itself complied with the procedures of the RLA."'
Further, the right to injunctive relief may be limited to situations where
the party-defendant has violated the RLA. This was the basis on which
the Court in the Telegraphers case distinguished prior cases allowing injunctions. "It is true that ...where collective bargaining agents stepped
outside their legal duties and violated the Act . . .we held that they could
R.&I. Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1961). See also Butte, A. & Pat.
Ry. v. Locomotive Eng'rs, 268 F.2d 54 (9th Cir. 1959); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.
TWU, 7 Av. Cas. 18,428 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
4' 325 U.S. 711, 725 (1945).
42353 U.S. 30, 47 n.24 (1957).
"'Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 292, 307 (1963).
44 292 F.2d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1961).
41 See cases cited note 40, supra. Two recent decisions have stated that the lack of "clean
hands" is not an absolute bar to injunctive relief, but rather that this is but one factor to be
considered in the weighing of equities (i.e., a balancing of competing interests) which may tip the
scales away from granting the requested relief. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron &
Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. TrainB.B.R.R., 385 F.2d 581, 614 (D.C.Cir. 1968); Illinois
men, 68 L.R.R.M. 2817 (7th Cir. 1968).
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be enjoined."' Perhaps the best construction of this area is that presented
in American Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA "7 wherein the court stated that a
strike in a minor dispute situation was illegal per se, but "in the case of
a major dispute a strike is not illegal per se and can not be enjoined if
the processes of the Railway Labor Act have been complied with and
exhausted." The court went on to hold that the procedures of the Act in
a major dispute were mandatory, and set out excerpts of the legislative
history of Norris-LaGuardia which tended to show that that Act did not
bar injunctive relief.' The burden of proof to show a failure to comply
with the Act is on the seeking party," and this seemingly applies to one
seeking to show non-compliance on counterclaim."
Where the procedures of the Act in major disputes have not been exhausted, and there is no finding that the moving party has itself violated
the Act, courts have generally granted an injunction to prevent circumvention of the Act's processes, i.e., to maintain the status quo pending the
exhaustion of those procedures. Carriers have been enjoined from making
unilateral changes in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions without
filing a section 6 notice; 1 from instituting a change in working conditions while NMB mediation is in progress;"z and courts have used their
equitable power to compel the carrier to bargain." Unions have been enjoined for failure to bargain in good faith; " for striking over an issue
without having filed a section 6 notice;" for engaging in strikes, work
stoppages, and slow-downs during NMB mediation;" for threatening to
strike over a proposed merger;"s for refusing to bargain during the thirty
day cooling-off period;" for picketing and engaging in work stoppages
while negotiations were going on;" for threatening to strike during the
46362 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1960). See also Chicago, R.&I. Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's Union,
292 F.2d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1961).
"8 169 F. Supp. 777, 787-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
4 1d. at 788-89.
"°Chicago, RI. & Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1961); American
Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 169 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 185
F. Supp. 77 (D. Minn. 1960); Belt Ry. of Chicago v. Locomotive Eng'rs, 45 Lab. Cas. 17,703
(N.D. 111. 1962).
5
" Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50 (1944).
"tManning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817
(1964); and Railroad Yardmasters v. Pennsylvania R.R., 224 F.2d 226 (3d Cir. 1955). Cf.
United Industrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir.
1965) (no injunction issued but lower court ordered to frame appropriate relief in light of finding
that dispute was major and not minor). Compare, St. Louis, S.F. & Tex. Ry. v. R.R. Yardmasters,
328 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 980 (1964).
'
" Southern Ry. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen, 337 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
"Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Ruby v. American Airlines,
Inc., 329 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1964).
54
Long Island R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 185 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1960)
(TRO granted pending full bearing).
5'KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. TWU, 8 Av. Cas. 18,395 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
s' United Air Lines, Inc. v. IAM, 8 Av. Cas. 17,869 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Chicago & W.I. R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 221 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
" Pennsylvania R.R. v. TWU, 202 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Pa. 1962); American Airlines, Inc. v.
TWU, 202 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); New York Cent. R.R. v. TWU, 49 L.R.R.M. 2897
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
'
" Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 185 F. Supp. 350
(E.D.N.Y. 1960).
"American Airlines, Inc. v. TWU, 9 Av. Cas. 17,257 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (lack of good faith in
trying to settle dispute).
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investigation of an Emergency Board;6" and finally for attempting to
force the carrier to bargain about an unlawful subject."'
In summary, it can be said that the courts have not been hesitant to
assume jurisdiction to compel compliance with the procedures of the RLA
by means of a labor injunction. Unlike the NLRA, the parties are not
free to engage in self-help during the bargaining stages. The Railway Labor
Act has established an elaborate dispute settlement procedure in this' area
to prevent disruption of interstate commerce, and the duty has been placed
on the parties to exhaust this procedure before engaging in self-help with
its consequent disruption of interstate transportation facilities. Thus, the
position assumed by the courts is entirely consistent : with, and a means
of achieving, this goal.
III.

MAJOR DISPUTES

A. Statutory Procedures
The RLA divides disputes into two categories and sets out separate procedures which the parties must follow in each. Although the Act did not
label these two categories of disputes, the terms "minor disputes" and
"major disputes" have commonly been applied to them. The statutory
basis for minor disputes is found in section 3 (i) of the Act; minor disputes are generally described as involving employee grievances or the interpretation or application of an existing and effective agreement."2 In a
1945 case differentiating the two categories, the Supreme Court said that
a minor dispute "contemplates the existence of a collective agreement
already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no effort is made
to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a new one."
The statutory basis for a major dispute is set out in sections 5 and 6 of
the Act; these disputes are generally described as controversies over rates
of pay, rules, or working conditions in the negotiation of a new contract."'
The Supreme Court distinguished these disputes from minor disputes by
describing major disputes as ones which "arise where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the
issue is not whether an existing agreement controls the controversy."
The definition of these terms is not difficult, but the application of them
poses a serious problem to the courts as will be discussed below.
In both major and minor disputes the parties are first required to attempt to reach a settlement between themselves without assistance. 6 If
the parties fail to reach a settlement at this stage, the procedures as to each
diverge widely.
Where there is a major dispute, the party desiring to change the terms
"Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
"' Pullman Co. v. Order of Ry. Conductors, 49 L.R.R.M. 3162 (N.D. 11. 1962).
62
See Wisehart, The Airlines Recent Experience Under the Railway Labor Act, 25 L. &-CONTEM.
PROB. 22, 27 (1960).
63Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723

(1945).

"4See Wisehart, supra note 62.
"5Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945).
66RLA § 2, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 48 Stat. 1168, 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1964).
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of the collective agreement must give at least thirty days written notice
to the other party in order to impose a duty to bargain, the so-called
"section 6 notice."" Changes made without filing a section 6 notice are
invalid and constitute a violation of the Act. " However, if the parties
bargain over a proposed change without a section 6 notice having been
filed, they have waived their right to such notice."m After the section 6
notice is filed, the parties must agree within ten days after receipt of such
notice on the time and place for the beginning of negotiations."0 If the
parties reach an impasse in their negotiations, the NMB may step in,
either at the request of one of the parties to the dispute or on its own
motion where it finds that a labor emergency exists." The NMB attempts
to mediate the dispute and to encourage the parties to reach a settlement.
This is the second step of the major dispute procedure, and it is known as
the "mediation" stage. Once the NMB concludes that no settlement will
be reached through mediation, it is required to make an effort to get the
parties to agree to voluntary arbitration by the provisions of the Act. 2
If, as is the usual case, one party refuses to submit the matter to voluntary
arbitration, the NMB has two choices: (1) it may officially withdraw from
the dispute, and if it should do so, the parties must maintain the status quo
as to rates of pay, rules, or working conditions or established practices in
effect prior to the time the dispute arose for thirty days after the official
withdrawal of the NMB"a or (2) it may notify the President of the
United States that the dispute in its opinion threatens "substantially to
interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of
the country of essential transportation service" and may recommend that
the President appoint an emergency board.' It is then in the President's
discretion whether to create an emergency board.
Once an emergency board has been set up, the parties must maintain
the status quo during the period the emergency board is investigating the
dispute and for a period of thirty days after the board submits its report
6 RLA § 6, 44 Stat. 582, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. S 156 (1964). While withdrawal of a section 6 notice has been held to remove the subject of such notice from bargaining,
American Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 169 F. Supp. 777, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), the converse seems
to be true if the party attempting to withdraw the subject takes action involving the very item
on which it attempts to withdraw from the bargaining table. See Butte, A. & P. Ry. v. Brotherhood
of Loco. Firemen, 268 F.2d 54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 L.R.R.M. 3001 (1959). No duty to
bargain exists in the absence of a section 6 notice as a general rule, subject to the exceptions
noted below. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen, 332 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 932 (1964).
" See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. (1960); Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen v. Chicago, N.S. & M.R.R., 147 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 852 (1946); Burke v. Morphy, 109 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
635 (1941). However, the court may find that the action was not a change in the agreement
but rather involves an interpretation of the agreement and is a minor dispute. See Part 11, B,
Major or Minor, infra.
"'See FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 182, 190-91 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 307 F.2d
510 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 950 (1963); Childers v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 192 F.2d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 1951); ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., 7 Av. Cas. 17,936
(M.D. Tenn. 1962).
70 RLA § 6, 44 Stat. 582, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964).
7
'RLA § 203, 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. § 183 (1964).
7 RLA §
7-9, 44 Stat. 582-85, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. §§ 157-59, 161 (1964).
7 RLA 5 5, 44 Stat. 580, as amended, 48 Stat. 1195, 45 U.S.C.
S 155 (1964).
74RLA § 10, 44 Stat. 586, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).
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to the President. The emergency board is given thirty days to make its
investigation and to submit its report, but it can, and usually does, get
extensions of this period."5 Each party presents its side of the dispute before
the emergency board, and although there is no express statutory authority,
the board attempts further mediation to reach a settlement." The emergency board then submits its findings and recommendations for settlement
in its report to the President. These findings and recommendations are not
in any way binding on the parties to the dispute. In the majority of cases
the findings of the emergency board are rejected by one or both of the
parties and in many cases they merely create a floor for further bargaining. If after the expiration of the thirty day period following the submission of the board's report to the President a settlement has not been
reached, then the parties are free to resort to self-help, and no injunction
can issue to prevent this." .
B. Major Or Minor?
When a dispute between the parties arises, the initial question becomes
whether the subject matter is a major or a minor dispute. The courts ultimately must decide if the parties cannot agree, and the test used is the
classic definition of major and minor disputes set forth in Elgin, J.& E.
Ry.v. Burley:"8
The first [major disputes] relates to disputes over the formation of collective
agreements or efforts to secure them. They arise where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the issue
is not whether an existing agreement controls the controversy. They look to
the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to
have vested in the past.
The second class [minor disputes], however, contemplate the existence of a

collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which
no effort is made to bring about formal change in terms or to create a new
one. The dispute relates either to the meaning or proper application of a
particular provision with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted
case. In either case the claim is to rights accrued, not merely to have new
ones created for the future. . . .The so-called minor disputes . .. affect the
smaller differences which inevitably appear . . . or arise incidentally in the

course of employment.
All subsequent decisions have relied on this distinction in reaching a
conclusion of whether the dispute is major or minor. This question has
generally arisen in a suit for injunctive relief from an alleged violation of
the Act," or in a suit for declaratory judgment on the duty to bargain,"0
75See, e.g., Emergency Boards Nos. 120,
76

121, 123, 124.

Id.

"'Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963). One court, at least, has
intimated that an injunction may be available if the other party has failed to bargain in good
faith prior to the exhaustion of the Act's procedures. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Switchmen's
Union, 292 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1961).
78325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945).
7
See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Eng'rs, 332 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 932 (1964).
"°See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. New York Cent. R.R., 246 F.2d 114 (6th Cir.),
cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 877 (1957).
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or in a suit to compel submission to a system board." Courts have generally held that determination of the question of jurisdiction, as well as
the merits, is for the system board; the courts limit themselves to a preliminary determination as to whether the agreement arguably covers the
action taken.
Major and minor disputes are not mutually exclusive however. The
problem arises in the close case which has elements of both. Most courts
have recognized that a dispute can contain elements of both,' i.e., have
an affect on rates of pay, rules, and working conditions and at the same
time involve interpretation of the agreement, and decisions rendered in
this overlapping area are predictably conflicting. One court, for example,
has held a refusal to cross a picket line of another union to be a minor dispute on the theory that its right to refuse was a matter of interpretation
under the collective bargaining agreement. 4 Other courts have held just
the opposite on the theory that the refusal was a part of the major dispute
between the carrier and the second union and did not present a question
of interpretation of the agreement." These cases illustrate the problem,
which ultimately is one of characterization faced both by the parties and
the court. By characterizing the dispute as involving a question of whether
the action taken was authorized by or violates the agreement, the court
finds a minor dispute; and by characterizing the dispute as one involving
a change in working conditions, rates of pay, or rules in violation of the
act, the dispute is major." Thus, the same type of dispute can be characterized as either major or minor." "This distinction, however, like many
others in the law, is more easily stated than applied.""
8 See, e.g., Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 331 F.2d 433

(5th Cir. 1964); FEIA v. American

Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1962).
8United Industrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183 (5th
Cir. 1965); Southern Ry. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen, 337 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 331 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964);
Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962); FEIA v. American
Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1962); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United R.R. Workers, 271 F.2d
87 (2d Cir. 1959), jdg. vacated on other grounds, 364 U.S. 278 (1960).
"See, e.g., Long Island R.R. v. System Fed'n No. 156, 368 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1966) (union
enjoined from engaging in work stoppages and slowdowns for failing to comply with the Act
but no determination if major or minor dispute involved); Southern Ry. v. Brotherhood of Loco.
Firemen, 337 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1964); IAM v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 8 Av. Cas. 17,947 (S.D.
Fla. 1963), aff'd, 320 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1963); FEIA v. Western Airlines, Inc., 7 Av. Cas. 17,500
(S.D. Cal. 1961) (carrier filed section 6 notice on subject and submitted question of compliance
to system board); In re Hudson & M. R.R., 172 F. Supp. 329.(S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd per curiam
sub 84
nom., Stichman v. General Grievance Committee, 267 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1959).
IAM v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 304 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1962) (in effect, the court separated
the pre-existing major dispute from the present controversy and held the refusal to cross the
picket line presented a different question.)
8"Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. FEIA, 9 Av. Cas. 17,412 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen v. Florida E.C. Ry., 346 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1965);
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. TWU, 190 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
"See, e.g., Florida E,C. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 990 (1965).
8"Compare Order of Ry. Conductors v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 366 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1966)
(dispute over layover facilities major) with Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R.R., 290 F.2d 881 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 900 (1961) (unilateral assignment of workers to different terminal
minor) and Norfolk & P.B.L.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34 (4th Cir.
1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958) (unilateral change in reporting points minor).
(7th Cir.
88 Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen, 397 F.2d 541
1968) (citing Southern Ry. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen, 384 F.2d 323, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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Where the parties disagree as to whether the dispute is major or minor,
the courts, though not always clear, have formulated some sort of guidelines, relying in large part on the Burley case. Generally, the courts have
held that the characterization of the parties is not controlling because the
substance of the controversy controls rather than the parties' characterization. As stated in Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Eng'rs:0
We readily recognize that here ...the difference ...between the interpretation and application of an existing agreement, and .. .a change in an
original intended basis of agreement is often a question of degree.
In reaching for resolution of this problem of course we must not place undue emphasis on the contentions or the maneuvers of the parties. Management
will assert that its position, whether right or wrong, is only an interpretation
or application of the existing contract. Unions, on the other hand, in their
assertions about the dispute at issue, will obviously talk in terms of change.
Since a Section 6 notice is required by the statute in order to initiate a major
dispute, the labor representatives are likely to serve such a notice in any dispute arising out of any ambiguous situation so as thereby to make the controversy more like a major dispute ...
In United Industrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves,"
the court, in holding the dispute major, said:
[Whether a dispute is major or minor] is to be tested as a matter of substance since a carrier imposing changes in nowise contemplated or arguably
covered by the agreement is not to escape . . . the Act merely through the
device of unilateral action ....This follows from ...the law's refusal to
determine "major" or "minor" by the labels affixed by the interested combatants .. .[Footnotes omitted.].
To some extent, however, the characterization of these disputes is going
to depend on the action of the parties. If the carrier makes a unilateral
change, and the union protests the action as a violation of an existing
agreement as well as a change in working conditions, the courts will more
than likely find a minor dispute. Conversely, if the union protests the
action and files a section 6 notice and does not mention the existing agreement, then, assuming the carrier is relying on the agreement as justification, it is a toss-up as to whether the dispute is major or minor, the outcome depending in some degree on the carrier's ability, or lack thereof, to
point to contract provisions which seem to support its action. If a union
protests unilateral action by a carrier as a violation of the agreement, even
if it at the same time files a section 6 notice to modify the agreement to
prevent such action in the future, it would seem that the union has implicitly recognized that the existing agreement arguably allows the unilateral action, hence a minor dispute, and intends by its section 6 notice
to modify the agreement to prevent any further action along similar lines
while contesting the validity of the action under the present agreement."
s'307 F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Norfolk & P.B.L.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958); Brotherhood of
Loco. Eng'rs v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 266 F.2d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other
grounds, 363 U.S. 528 (1960).
'0351 F.2d 183, 188-89 (5th Cir. 1965).
' See, e.g., Spokane Ry. v. O.R.C. & B., 265 F. Supp. 892 (D.D.C. 1967); Great No. Ry. v.
Transportation Workers Union, 63 L.R.R.M. 2411 (D. Minn. 1966).
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It is where the parties fail to agree on the nature of the dispute or do
not seek to pursue both procedures that the controversy arises. Where
both have treated the dispute as major or as minor, it seems the courts
have not questioned their construction, evidently because the issue was
not raised.
The controversy generally arises when the carrier has instituted a unilateral change, and the union insists that the change constitutes a change
in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, and that, therefore, the carrier must bargain. The union either threatens to strike, or does strike, or
goes to court seeking to compel the carrier to bargain, or to enjoin the
carrier from making the change in violation of the procedures for major
disputes. If the carrier brings the suit, usually where the union has threatened to or actually does strike, the carrier seeks to enjoin the strike or to
compel the union to submit the dispute to a system board, or to obtain a
declaratory judgment on the duty to bargain. Usually the court is faced
with several of the above requests for relief from both parties. It is in
this posture that the courts have been faced with the necessity of determining whether a dispute is major or minor. The problem is complicated
by the fact that the initial procedure in a major and minor dispute is the
same, that is, the parties must negotiate the dispute between themselves
before calling in outside assistance.
This problem area can be analogized to cases arising under the NLRA.
Under section 8 (d) of that Act an employer has a duty to negotiate in
good faith on terms and conditions of employment. If a collective bargaining agreement is in effect, neither party has any further duty to
negotiate on items covered by the contract."2 However, the NLRB has
held that absent clear waiver by the union, the employer must notify and
bargain with the union before it institutes any change in working conditions neither covered by the contract nor expressly discussed by the parties during negotiations leading to such contract." The union also has the
alternative of pursuing the arbitration provisions of its contract as well as
filing unfair labor practice charges. The NLRB has made this course very
profitable by holding that if an employer takes unilateral action which it
contends is allowed by the contract, and even though the contract has an
arbitration provision, it is an unfair labor practice if the employer failed
to notify and offer to negotiate with the union prior to the change,"' in
essence holding that even if the conduct is arguably allowed by the contract, if it has an adverse effect on the employees in the bargaining unit,

the employer must offer to bargain with the union or risk a finding by
the NLRB or courts that the contract did not cover the action taken."
9See, e.g., C & S Industries, Inc., 158 N.L.R.B. 454 (1966); Ador Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1658
(1965); Druwhit Metal Prods. Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 346 (1965).
"aSee, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Huttig Sash & Door, 377 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1967); Unit Drop Forge
Div., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1968); Rockwell Standard Corp., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1967);
Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966).
94 N.L.R.B. v. Huttig Sash & Door, 377 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1967); UAW v. General Motors
Corp., 64 L.R.R.M. 2489 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
sa Compare UAW v. General Motors Corp., 64 L.R.R.M. 2489 (D.C. Cir. 1967), with Ador
Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1658 (1965); New York Mirror, 151 N.L.R.B. 834, 837-41 (1965).
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The NLRB has given very narrow construction to collective bargaining
agreements, requiring "a clear and unmistakeable waiver" before holding
that the employer has the right to take the proposed unilateral action."
The result of these decisions is to give the union "two bites at the apple"
-pursuit of arbitration, arguing that the contract does not allow the
conduct of the employer, and pursuit of unfair labor practice charges
against the employer should it fail to notify and offer to negotiate on
the change." Essentially the same result is reached under the RLA. The
carrier announces a change and the union protests; the parties then confer
on the proposed change. Under the Act, or by case decision, the status
quo is maintained pending resolution of the dispute, be it major or minor.
Under the NLRA the employer is free to institute the change after negotiations with the union, subject only to possible back pay awards by an
arbitrator. The union, of course, has the right to submit the dispute to
arbitration or file unfair labor practice charges or, absent a no-strike clause
or arbitration clause, can strike in support of its position. Under the RLA,
the union also has certain alternatives. It can submit the dispute to a system board of adjustment or the NRAB if it feels the conduct violates the
existing contract or can contend that the action is a change in working conditions without the proper procedures having been followed by the carrier
(a major dispute) and hence illegal. In either event, the union can utilize
the courts to compel the carrier to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the dispute. The only material distinction between the procedures
is whether the union must submit to binding arbitration or whether it has
the ultimate right to strike after exhaustion of the major disputes procedures."
Thus, when the question arises and is brought to the courts for resolution, the issue is really whether the union has the right to strike in support of its contention at the conclusion of the Act's procedures (with the
carrier's coexistent right to make the change and to continue to operate
in face of the strike). Where there is a pre-existing major dispute pending
between the parties, the courts have examined the section 6 notice filed
by either party to determine whether the particular point in controversy
was covered. This has generally been construed as a question of fact, that
is, whether the carrier's action is on a subject being bargained on pursuant
to the notice or whether the particular change is not covered by the notice."
" For example, the NLRB has recently ruled that a waiver clause stating each party waived
its rights to bargain over all matters, whether covered by the contract or not, whether discussed
during negotiations or not, whether or not contemplated or known at the time, did not, in fact,
constitute a waiver by the union. Unit'Drop Forge Div., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1968). Compare
N.L.R.B. v. Adams Dairy, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965); N.L.R.B. v. Royal Plating & Polish
Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965); and N.L.R.B. v. Transmarine Nay. Corp., 65 L.R.R.M. 2861
(9th Cir. 1967).
97 See Acme Industrial v. N.L.R.B., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). Cf. Carey v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp.,
375 U.S. 261 (1964).

"8See text accompanying notes 147-153, infra.
99
See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 362 U.S. 330 (1960); Florida
E.C. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
990 (1965); Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R.R., 290 F.2d 881 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 900
(1961); Order of Ry. Conductors v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 366 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1966);
United Industrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir.
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However, where no section 6 notice has been filed, or the court has determined that the dispute is not covered by the notice, the courts' examination has seemed to take a different tact. Since, in these cases there is no
notice which can be examined, or there has already been a determination
that the subject is not covered by the notice, the courts seemingly resort
to characterization of the dispute, relying heavily on the Burley distinction.
An initial question which faces the court is whether there is in fact a
contract. While the question does not often arise, it has arisen in situations
where the consequences of the proposed action can be extremely adverse
to employees or the carrier, such as after a merger.
The courts have almost consistently held that the question of contract
validity presents a justicable issue." In this respect, the courts act in a
way analogous to section 301 suits to compel arbitration under the
L-MRA."' Sometimes, however, it is a close question as to whether the
question is one of validity or of interpretation.' 2 The confusion that can
result is pointed out in Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA." 3 There, the carrier
had a collective bargaining agreement with ALPA covering its pilots.
When the carrier lost its MATS contract, it furloughed all its pilots and
notified ALPA that the agreement was terminated. ALPA responded by
saying that the agreement was merely dormant. When the carrier obtained
a new MATS contract it did not recall the furloughed pilots as required
by the contract, and ALPA brought suit in a federal district court for
injunctive relief and declaratory judgment. The district court held the
carrier had violated the Act by refusing to bargain with the union, who
was still the certified representative of the craft' and by refusing to set
up a system board as required by section 204 of the Act. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed that part of the district court's decision which required the carrier
to establish a system board, thus enforcing this'duty imposed under the
Act,"° and implicitly recognized that ALPA was still the certified
representative. The court went on to hold, however, that the question of
1965); Southern Ry. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen, 337 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1964); FEIA

v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1962); Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Loco.

Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962); In re Hudson & M.R.R., 172 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1959),
aff'd per curiam sub nom.; Stichman v. General Grievance Committee, 267 F.2d 941 (2d Cir.
1959).
'°'See Felter v. Southern Pac. Co., 359 U.S. 326 (1959); Order of Ry. Conductors v. Switchmen's Union, 269 F.2d 726 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 899 (1959); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Smith, 251 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1958); Railroad Yardmasters v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
224 F.2d 226 (3d Cir. 1955); Switchmen's Union v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., 209 F.2d
419 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954); Capitol Airways, Inc. v. ALPA, 7 Av. Cas.
17,165 (M.D. Tenn. 1961).
"'See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
"02 See, e.g., Felter v. Southern Pac. Co., 359 U.S. 326 (1959).
'03331 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964).
"'OSee Florida E.C. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172 (Sth Cir.). rert.
denied, 379 U.S. 990 (1964); ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., 7 Av. Cas. 17,936 (M.D. Tenn.
1962). Cf. FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 359 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966); Order of Ry. Conductors v. Switchmen's Union, 269 F.2d 726 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 899 (1959);
Switchmen's Union v. Southern Pac. Co., 253 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1957); Brotherhood of Ry.
Trainmen v. Smith, 251 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1958).
"'See FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 359 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966); FEIA v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1962).
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whether the contract was still in effect was for the system board and not
the court.
How, then, was this question [of whether the contract was still in effect]
to be decided? Obviously, it could be decided only by interpreting the agreement itself and thus it was a minor dispute, one which under the completely
uniform holdings of the courts must be submitted to the grievance procedures
with final decision to be made by the System Board ..
This holding seems to clearly conflict with all the previous decisions holding that questions of validity are for the courts, i.e., whether or not there
is a legally binding agreement." ' Further, there is no provision under the
RLA which provides for the termination of agreements, once made, until

the procedures provided by section 6 of the Act are exhausted.'

Thus

there is no question for a system board, since, as a matter of law, the
contract remained in effect, that is to say that there could not be a question raised as to termination since under the Act there could be none, no
section 6 notice having been filed.
There is an argument which can be made, however, to support the decision of the court. Since section 204 of the RLA requires the parties to
establish a system board and this is separate and apart from the collective
bargaining agreement, all questions of contract construction can be thrown
to the system board. Unlike arbitration under section 301 of the L-MRA
which is based on a contract clause and, therefore, requires a valid contract before there can be arbitration,' . a section 204 system board exists
even if the contract does not, and it has the jurisdiction to determine all
issues of contract construction, including the question of termination.
However, this theory would still seem inapposite in this case under the long
line of cases holding that contracts do not terminate until after section 6
procedures have been exhausted."'
Certain standards can be gleaned from the cases as to the criteria used
by the courts. Generally, if the action is arguably covered by the agreement, then it must go to the system board for determination of whether
the dispute is major or minor, even if there is an affect on rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions."' The courts seem to be holding that if the
100331 F.2d at 436.
107Cf. Railroad Yardmasters v. Pennsylvania R.R., 224 F.2d 226 (3d Cir. 1955); Capitol
Airways, Inc. v. ALPA, 7 Av. Cas. 17,165 (M.D. Tenn. 1961) (both holding that a question as
to proper execution of the contract presented a question of validity). See also John Wiley & Sons v.
Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (holding that a question of contract termination under section
301 of the L-MRA is for the courts).
I "See Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817
(1964). See Part IV, B, infra.
'"'See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
',OSee text accompanying notes 158-160, infra.
.' See Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 342 F.2d 298 (5th Cir.
1965); FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 320 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1963) (stating, "The mere fact
that the matters complained of are alleged violations of the Railway Labor Act as well as violations
of the collective bargaining contract does not oust the system board of its exclusive jurisdiction.");
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen, 332 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 932 (1964); Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962);
FEIA v. American Airlines, Inc., 303 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1962); Hilbert v. Pennsylvania R.R., 290
F.2d 881 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 900 (1961); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United R.R.
Workers, 271 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1959), vacated and rentanded on other grounds, 364 U.S. 278
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disputed subject is either arguably allowed or arguably prohibited by the
agreement, then the dispute is minor. As stated in Galveston Wharves:"'
[If] by its terms of [or?] reasonable implication therefrom, the collective
agreement apparently affords some arguable basis for the action, the interpretation of the contract, the question of who is right . . . is for determination
by the Railroad Adjustment Board, a Court having jurisdiction only to mold
equitable relief to preserve the status quo pending . . . decision. The result
ordinarily is that unless the proposed change is to be reflected in a change in
the agreement, it is not a § 6 situation and remains a minor dispute....
A corollary doctrine has also been developed. The courts have, in line with
the arguably covered idea, stated that it will take more than a mere allegation of an affect on working conditions to constitute a major dispute. In
St. Louis, S.F. & Tex. Ry. v. Railroad Yardmasters,"a the carrier unilaterally
abolished the jobs of certain employees. The union sought an injunction,
claiming that the action violated the Act by changing working conditions
without complying with the major dispute procedures. The carrier contended its action was authorized by the existing contract. The court, in
holding the dispute minor, said that section 6 required bargaining procedures only where there was an intended change in agreements, affecting
working conditions. "If there is no intended change in an existing contract or agreement there is no requirement under section 6 that the bargaining procedures be followed .... The court went on to state that section
6 was not to be invoked every time a change has an effect on working
conditions, at least where the carrier's contention that the action is
authorized under the contract raises a substantial issue of interpretation.
"It is not a fictitious or merely colorable issue."''. As stated by the court
in IAM v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,"' holding that a change in rules was
minor even though not covered by the agreement expressly, it takes a substantial and clearly apparent change in the terms of the agreement to
constitute a major dispute. Otherwise, the dispute is minor because "the
exclusive jurisdiction of the system boards of adjustment could easily be
defeated in every case of disputed interpretation, by the facile expedient
of labelling the disputed action of the employer or the union as a
'change.' ""'
While the courts sometimes talk in terms of "exclusive" jurisdiction,"'
the doctrine seems to be one of primary jurisdiction, i.e., a defferal of
(1960); and Norfolk & P. B.L. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34 (4th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958).
"'351 F.2d 183, 188 ($th Cir. 1965).
...328 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 980 (1965).
114Id. at 752.
"'id. at 753. Subsequently, the union obtained an injunction to maintain the status quo, 231
F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Tex. 1964) (see text accompanying notes 149-53, infra). This order was
appealed, but the Board rendered a decision holding it had no jurisdiction, i.e., that the agreement
did not cover the dispute, before the Fifth Circuit reached a decision. The appeal was dismissed as
moot. 345 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1965).
"'8 Av. Cas. 17,947, 17,948 (S.D. Fla. 1963), aff'd, 320 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1963).
.. See also IAM v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 320 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1963) (unilateral cancellation of earned vacations and extension of work week minor because mere allegations of violation
of the Act as well as of the agreement does not affect system board jurisdiction).
"'See, e.g., JAM v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 320 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1963).
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of whether the dispute
do have jurisdiction to
union that the carrier
without notice is an

allegation that the carrier is violating the Act's duties," 9 which are enforceable by the courts.20
An analogous situation exists where the collective bargaining agreement
is silent on a point and no section 6 notice has been filed. In this situation, the courts have held the dispute to be minor on the basis of the
Burley distinction, i.e., it is "an omitted case" or one which arises "incidentally in the course of employment" and is "a situation in which no
effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms. 121 This was the'

situation in Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen,"' where
the court held that a change in a tie-up point and the union's request for
transportation to and from the point, while it did affect working conditions, was a minor dispute since there was no section 6 notice filed and the
contract was silent on the point. Similarly, in Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R. v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen," the court held that a dispute over
whether working conditions were in an unsafe condition was minor. While
the agreement was silent about safe working conditions, the carrier was
under a common law duty to maintain safe conditions and failure to do
so was. a minor dispute-one arising incidentally in the course of employment.
There are exceptions to this "general rule" as there are to most other
"rules of law." A dispute in a major/minor situation will be held major
if two facts are present. The unifying characteristic of all these cases is
the filing by one or both parties of a section 6 notice directed at the
specific point in controversy. This factor, however, has also been present
in many of the cases where the dispute was held to be minor.
The distinguishing factor in these cases has been that the parties by
their actions were obviously looking to the acquisition of new rights such
as implementation and improvement of an existing contract term, or
'"See RLA §§ 2, Third & 6, 44 Stat. 577, 44 Stat. 582, 45 U.S.C. §§
(1564).

152, Third and 156

"'See Part II, supra. Compare NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); Fibreboard Paper Prods.
v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
...
See FEJA v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 7 Av. Cas. 17,500 (S.D. Cal. 1961) (stating that
only subjects reached after collective bargaining are covered by the agreement and that the proby the agreement);
hibitions of section 6 go only to changes in rules and working conditions fixed
TAM v; Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 8 Av. Cas. 17,947 (S.D. Fla. 1963), aff'd, 320 F.2d 451 (5th
Cir. 1963). But see, Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen, 69 L.R.R.M.
2443 (6th Cir. 1968), where the court rejected the carrier's contention that the status quo
provisions of § 6 did not apply since the contract was silent on the point of contention, establishment of terminal points. The union had fileda § 6 notice on the point to forbid the
carrier from establishing a new terminal point which a special board had previously ruled in a
prior case it had the right to do under the existing contract. The court held that a change in
working conditions was involved even though the point was not embodied in the contract. The
court reasoned the place where employees had reported and terminated was a "working condition"
within the ambit of § 6. See also Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S.
330, 338 (1960).
denied, 379 U.S. 932 (1964).
12 332 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.), cert.
'23342 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1965).
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that the change was of such an extreme nature that it was obvious that
the terms and conditions of employment were being changed in violation
of the existing contract. This is a matter of degree, however slight, " from
the "assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the past . . . [and which]
relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision. . .. "" Courts, however, have given substance to the distinction.
In Order of Ry. Conductors v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry.,' the court held that
a dispute relating to lodging at away from home lay-over points presented
a major dispute. The issue was characterized as one looking to the acquisition of new rights for the future, and the facts tended to show that
the parties were not fighting over the interpretation of the existing agreement, but rather over the implementation and improvement of the existing terms."'
In Florida E. C. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,"u the carrier's
action in instituting unilateral changes went to an extreme. The situation
was complicated by the fact that the union was honoring the picket lines
of other unions lawfully striking the carrier, while, at the same time,
negotiating with the carrier over subjects covered by section 6 notices.
During these negotiations the carrier instituted changes in pay, in hours,
and abolished the union shop agreement-all unilaterally.2 ' The court
held that a major dispute was presented. "In short, the controversy is not
over what the bargaining contract now permits as a matter of contract
construction."" The court found that this action by the carrier did, in
substance, impose "changes in nowise contemplated or arguably covered
Thus, the facts showed not only that a section
by the agreement. . . ,,...
6 notice had been filed but also that the carrier's action was obviously
changing working conditions. In Galveston Wharves,' a2 the court held that
the carrier had to bargain over the leasing-out of grain elevators. The
parties were negotiating over a new contract and the union's second section 6 notice, filed after the carrier's action, expressly covered subcontracting. The carrier declined to negotiate over the grain warehouse
lease. The carrier contended that the existing contract gave it the power
to make the lease. The court held that the leasing-out presented a major
dispute, and that the carrier had violated the Act by failing to file a
section 6 notice and by refusing to bargain over its action. The court based
"' As stated in Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 1962):
"We readily recognize that here . . . the difference . . . between the interpretation and application
of an existing agreement, and . . . a change in an original intended basis of agreement is often
a question of degree." See also text accompanying notes 87-90, supra.
"Elgin,
J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945).
1"6366 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1966).
127The existing terms here were part of the national arbitration award and the parties were
negotiating over what was to be required in way of facilities furnished-an acquisition of rights
for the future and not a claim to rights vested in the past.
128336 F.2d 172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 990 (1964).
12 The carrier was using replacement workers when it instituted the changes as to wages and

hours.

10336 F.2d at 179.

"' United Industrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183, 188-89
(5th Cir. 1965). Compare St. Louis, S.F. & Tex. Ry. v. Railroad Yardmasters, 328 F.2d 749
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 980 (1964). See text accompanying notes 113-14, supra.
1a 3 5 1 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1965).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 3 5

its decision on the ground that the contract then in force expressly covered
work at the grain elevator facilities, and the carrier's action terminated
work which was guaranteed by the contract. Thus, the carrier had, in
substance, changed working conditions in a way obviously contrary to
the agreement. The court stated: '
When we look at the sharp outlines of this case through ordinary glasses,
not major or minor lenses, we can see this case for what it really is: during
the term of the contract, the Carrier terminated the contract by going out
of business. But it had no right to terminate the contract prior to its expiration. . . . Without trespassing on the exclusive domain of the Adjustment
Board, . . . it is plain that this action was not, and cannot even remotely be
justified as a "lay-off" . . . nor as the exercise of managerial prerogative ...
From this it can be seen that the court has added to the test enunciated
above. As pointed out by the dissent, the contract provisions in this case,
on their face, could arguably cover the action taken by the carrier. Under
the normal doctrine this would have been sufficient to send the dispute to
the adjustment board for determination. The court here has seemingly
shifted the emphasis from justification of an act under the terms of a
contract to the effect of the action taken on the employees and the agreement as a whole. Under the doctrine enunciated, the examination of the
dispute encompasses much more than a mere examination of the particular
clauses relied on by the carrier; it includes an examination of the effect of
the action on other rights of employees guaranteed by the contract and
whether the clauses relied on were intended for the purposes to which
they were used. If, after such an examination, the court can say that the
clauses arguably cover the dispute, then the dispute is minor. If, on the
other hand, the court finds that the carrier is attempting to use the clauses
in a way that was "in nowise contemplated or arguably covered by the
agreement" as a matter of substance, then the dispute is major. Under the
Galveston Wharves doctrine, courts will have to engage in a more detailed
preliminary examination than is required under the normal doctrine. The
exact limits of this examination, to avoid "trespassing on the exclusive
domain of the Adjustment Board," is yet to be delineated. Obviously,
however, an examination, in some detail, of the dispute itself without reference to the agreement is involved. Possibly the second step is a weighting
of the effect of the action as found by this examination against the claimed
justification of the carrier under the contract as found by a most perfunctory examination.' " Whether this doctrine or the normal doctrine
will prevail will have to await future decisions, and, in the Fifth Circuit
at least, the decision should be en banc.
There remains but one case which throws doubt on the whole area.
However, an examination of the case reveals that it is distinguishable, and,
in fact, reconciliable with the later decisions of the court of appeals. In
33

Id. at 189.
"' This seems to be what was done by the district court in Railroad Yardmasters v. St. Louis,
S.F. & Tex. Ry., 218 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Tex. 1963), 'rev'd, 328 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 980 (1964).
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Order of R. R. Telegraphers v. Chicago F,N.W. R.R.,1" the Supreme
Court, in holding the scope of the so-called management prerogative a
proper subject of bargaining,' answered a claim by the carrier that the
dispute was minor by saying:
Only a word need be said about the railroad's contention that the dispute
here with the union was a minor one. . . . [I]t is impossible to classify as
a minor dispute this dispute relating to a major change, affecting jobs, in
an existing collective bargaining agreement, rather than to mere infractions
or interpretations of the provisions of that agreement. Particularly since
the collective bargaining agreement which the union sought to change was
a result of mediation under the Railway Labor Act, this is the type of
major dispute that is not governed by the Adjustment Board.137
The carrier in both the lower courts.. had relied on a line of cases which
held that the exercise of management prerogative was neither a minor
dispute, since there was no provision in the agreement, nor a major dispute, since no section 6 notice had been filed. 3" The carrier had unilaterally
consolidated several stations which resulted in lay-offs. It had not claimed
the right to do this under the provisions of the existing contract and,
therefore, refused to bargain over it. It had asserted its minor dispute
claim in the trial court after a temporary restraining order had already
been entered. The trial court in rejecting this contention stated that the
agreement was reached pursuant to NMB mediation and was therefore,
for it, under section 5, Second of the Act," to interpret-that is to say
that the NMB, and not the NRAB, was the proper forum to hear the
dispute. In reversing, the Seventh Circuit did not mention the point, resting its decision solely on the ground that there was no labor dispute involved, which was the main contention of the carrier and the point with
which the Supreme Court primarily concerned itself. The Court agreed
with the trial court on the minor dispute point-:that it was for the NMB
-and held the dispute major because of the affect on working conditions:
"[P]lainly the controversy here relates to an effort on the part of the
union to1 change the 'terms' of an existing collective bargaining agree, 14

ment.

The Court seemingly based its refutation of the minor dispute contention on the grounds that the question of whether the agreement covered
it was for the NMB under section 5, Second of the Act and that the
carrier's action was obviously taken without reference to the agreement.
The agreement was silent on the point, thus possibly falling into the
"omitted case" category, but the impact on working conditions was so
great that the dispute could not have been contemplated by the agreement. An additional factor was that the carrier was willing to negotiate
'33362 U.S. 330 (1960).
136See Part III, D, infra.
13'362 U.S. at 341.
.3336 CCH Lab. Cas. 65,103 (N.D. II1. 1958), rev'd, 264 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1959).
139 See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. New York Cent. R.R., 246 F.2d 114 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied,
355 U.S. 877 (1957).
0
14 RLA § 5, Second, 44 Star. 580, as amended, 48 Stat. 1195, 45 U.S.C. S 155, Second (1964).
14'362 U.S. at 336.
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over the implementation of the plan, refusing to bargain only on the
abandonment and consolidation of jobs preceding the implementation.
This tended to show that the carrier was not in fact relying on the existing contract for authority. If the carrier had actually relied on the contract and based its action thereon, it is submitted that the Court would, as
the courts in later cases have, make a "major/minor examination.'.. 2 The
question is which test, Galveston Wharves or the normal one, the Court
would use. Telegraphers formed the basis for Fibreboard'' and Town &
Country Mfg.' Together, the three cases stand for the broad proposition
that the exercise of the so-called management right is subject to bargaining, at least where the exercise of the right has a significant affect on
working conditions. In the absence of a claim by the carrier that the
contract authorizes such action, i.e., a naked claim of right, it seems clear
that the dispute is major, since the effect on employees is substantial and
could not fall within the omitted case category. Where, however, as in
Galveston Wharves, there is an arguable basis in the contract authorizing
the action, different results can be obtained depending on the test used.
If the normal test is followed, the dispute will be referred to a system
board. The complaint usually levied against this process is the delay involved. As pointed out below, much of the adverse consequences flowing
from this delay has now been alleviated. On the other hand, if the Galveston Wharves test is used, and the court, relying heavily on the effect of
the action, holds the dispute major, the possibility exists that the court
has voided a valid contract right of the carrier. However tenuous the claim
may seem to the court in light of the effect the change accomplishes, the
claim is still there and the carrier has been denied the right to have the
expert forum, the system board, pass on its claim. While the claim may
be frivolous in many cases, it is the case where the claim is not frivolous
that the court has denied the carrier valid rights under an existing contract. As noted below, the profit has been taken out of using the minor
dispute procedures as a delay mechanism, thereby probably eliminating
most, if not all, of the frivolous claims that the contract covers the disputed
action. The desirability of substituting a court's judgment on the effect
of the change for a determination of a system board on the carrier's
claimed justification seems highly questionable, especially since prompt
resolution of contractual claims is now available.
One area of major/minor disputes remains to be examined-that of
procedural safeguards. While either party could obtain an injunction to
preserve the jurisdiction of the system board, i.e., to compel submission
of the dispute and to prevent strikes,' there was no provision for maintaining the status quo in a minor dispute situation." Any action taken by
142In fact, the Court has done this in the past. See Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S.
711 (1945).
14aFibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
1'Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, enf'd, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
'45See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
146 The Act provides for maintenance of the status quo in major disputes. RLA § 6, 44 Stat.

582, as amended, 48 Stat. 1197, 45 U.S.C. S 156 (1964).
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a carrier or a union, aside from refusing to comply with the procedures,
which the other party claimed was a violation of the agreement could be
effectuated immediately. Many times the decision of the system board or,
more generally, the NRAB came to late to be of any value. Since the
action complained of was an accomplished fact, it was impossible in many
situations to return to the status quo ante. In 1960, the Supreme Court
attempted to correct this deficiency in Brotherhood of Loco. Eng'rs v.
Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R."' The Court there held that an injunction,
sought by a party to compel compliance with the minor dispute procedures
(here a carrier seeking to enjoin a threatened strike), could be conditioned
so as to compel the maintenance of the status quo pending resolution
of the dispute. The Court held that imposing conditions on the issuance
of an injunction was within the traditional equity powers of a court, and
did not constitute a preliminary determination on the merits of'the dispute.
[It is not the function of the court] to construe the contractual provisions
upon which the parties relied for their respective positions on the merits...
It is true that a District Court must make some examination of the nature
of the dispute before conditioning relief since not all disputes coming before
the Adjustment Board threaten irreparable injury and justify the attachment
of a condition.... We think that, in logic, we must hold that the conditions
are proper also, at least where they are designed not only to promote the
interests of justice, but also to breserve the jurisdiction of the Board...
[T]he action of the district judge [in conditioning an injunction], rather
than defeating the Board's jurisdiction, would operate to preserve that jurisdiction by preventing injury so irreparable that a decision of the Board in
the union's favor would be but an empty victory. . . The balancing of
these competing claims [by the carrier and the union] of irreparable hardship
is, however, the traditional function of the equity court, the exercise of which
is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion [Emphasis added.]."
The Court, however, left open the question of "whether a federal court
can, during the pendency of a dispute before the Board, enjoin a carrier
from effectuating the changes which gave rise to and constitute the subject matter of the dispute, independently of any suit by the railroad for
equitable relief."'" Lower courts have seemingly proceeded to answer this
question affrmatively.' ° Logically. an affirmative answer is proper since
the thing sought to be avoided is present whether or not the union
threatens to strike. It should not be a prerequisite to maintaining the
status quo that the union call a strike if under equitable principles of
irreparable harm, no adequate remedy at law, etc., there is a need for
the equitable relief. As stated in Westchester Lodge 2186,' while allowing an independent suit by the union to maintain the status quo:
147 363 U.S. 528 (1960).
48
5
1 d. at 533-35. See also, Chicago, M., St.P. & Pac. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen,
66 L.R.R.M. 2331 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Texas Pac.-Mo. Pat. Terminal R.R. of N.O. v. Brotherhood
of Ry. & S.S.Clerks, 232 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. La. 1964).
149 363 U.S. at 531 n.3.
'"Sce,e.g., Westchester Lodge 2186, Bhd. of Ry. & S.S.Clerks v. Railway Express Agency, 32.9
F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1964); Spokane Ry. v. ORC&B, 64 L.R.R.M. 2790 (D.D.C. 1967); and R.R.
Yardmasters v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 231 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Tex. 1964), appeal dismissed per curiam,
345 F.2d 181 (sth Cir. 1965).
1"1 329 F.2d at 752-53.
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But because a dispute is minor, it does not follow that the District Court
had no jurisdiction to grant a preliminary injunction to maintain the status
quo pending the outcome of a determination by the Adjustment Board ...
The effect [of requiring a suit by the carrier to enjoin a threatened strike]
is to encourage unions to take insincere strike votes to provoke the carrier
into seeking an injunction, hoping that the District Court will deem retention of the status quo proper. .. . [W]e find . . . [nothing] in the Railway
Labor Act which prohibits a federal court from issuing an injunction to
restore the status quo in a minor dispute if the court's discretion is soundly
exercised to preserve the primary jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board.
This new procedural remedy has accomplished two things. First, it has
provided a safeguard against a party carrying an act into effect when that
act, the authority to do it, is being disputed and effectuation would result
in irreparable harm. Secondly, it has eliminated, to some degree, the use
of the minor dispute procedures as a delay mechanism. Since a party
can no longer act with impunity in making changes, the profit in delaying
decision of the right to do so has been removed. The 1966 amendments to
the Act, allowing creation of system boards on the railroads,1 2 should
also aid in alleviating this problem since the time factor involved will be
substantially less, thereby eliminating much of the basis for the claim of
irreparable injury." 3 Further, even if a status quo injunction is issued no
tremendous burden will be placed on either party since there will be a
prompt resolution of the conflicting claims.
One final point should be noted. The construction given by the courts
to this question of whether a dispute is major or minor, and the formulation arrived at, bears a strong resemblance to the test enunciated by the
Supreme Court in cases arising under section 301 of the LMRA," 4 most
notably the Steelworkers Triology. The Court, in one of these cases, United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 5' stated:
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless
it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should
be resolved-in favor of coverage.
Thus, it is for the courts to determine the question of arbitrabilitywhether the arbitration clause covers the disputed point-under section
301.158 This would seem to be analogous to a court determination of
whether the dispute is covered by the agreement under the Railway Labor
Act, and, therefore, for the NRAB or system board, i.e., the arbitrator.
However, if the Galveston Wharves test... is followed, it would seem that
the examination under the Railway Labor Act is balanced in favor of
requiring bargaining rather than requiring arbitration. But even under
152

80 Star. 208 (1966).

13 See, e.g., Railroad Yardmasters

v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 231 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Tex. 1964),
appeal dismissed per curiam, 345 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1965).
15429 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
'5'363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
15'See John Wiley & Sons v. Livingstone, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568-69 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
157See text accompanying 132-34, supra.
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Galveston Wharves "doubts" will seemingly be resolved in favor of arbitration.
C. Agreements-Section 6 Notice And Effect
Changes in agreements are brought about by the procedures established
in the RLA. "The effect of § 6 is to prolong agreements subject to its
provisions regardless of what they say as to termination. .

.

. [T]he very

purpose of § 6 is to stabilize relations by artificially extending the lives of
agreements for a limited period regardless of the parties' intentions." ''
Once the section 6 notice is filed, or possibly even without such notice
if the parties bargain over a subject not covered by a section 6 opener,'5'
the courts seem consistently to hold that the agreement remains in effect
until the procedures of the Act are exhausted. This position is in accord
with the purpose of the Act-to maintain the status quo."'
Agreements have also been held to survive a variety of adverse consequences not related to the duration clause of the contract. In FEIA v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc."'5 the court stated that, while the agreement had
terminated following the exhaustion of the major dispute procedures, the
system board created between the parties by the contract was probably
still the proper forum to hear complaints arising before the expiration of
the contract, even though there was no grievance procedure available
since the contract had expired. The court held that claims arising after
expiration date were not referable to a system board-that the carrier
could not be compelled to establish one since there was no duty under
the Act to do so, as FEIA was no longer the bargaining representative.
Compare ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc.'62 wherein the court held that
the employer/employee relationship was not terminated by the expiration
of the contract, that employees on strike were entitled to the right of
reinstatement subject to the rights of replacement workers, and, finally,
' 'Manning

v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817

(1964). See also United Industrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d
183 (Sth Cir. 1965); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. TWU, 190 F. Supp. 495 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
But cf. Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 331 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933
(1964) (holding that question of contract termination was for system board).
" This is the so-called theory of waiver, i.e., by bargaining on a subject not covered by a
section 6 notice, the parties have waived the right to have such a notice served as required by the
Act. See Childers v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 192 F.2d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 1951); ALPA v.
Southern Airways, Inc., 7 Av. Cas. 17,936 (M.D. Tenn. 1962); FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,
208 F. Supp. 182, 190-91 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 307 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.denied, 372 U.S.
941 (1963).
'"See, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & B.B.R.R., 65 L.R.R.M. 2229, 2235
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (effect of S 6 "'is to prolong agreements . . . regardless of what they say
as to termination' "); FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 359 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (carrier does
not have to establish system board since contract expired after procedures of Act exhausted); Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1964) (purpose of section 6 is to prevent
"rocking the boat by either side" and keep the old agreement in effect until Act's procedures are
exhausted, hence carrier must continue to check-off dues); United Industrial Workers v. Board of
Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1965) (contract "iemains in effect until
exhaustion of Act's procedures, hence carrier could not unilaterally lease out facility and terminate
employees without filing section 6 notice); and FEIA v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 305 F.2d
675 (8th Cir. 1962) (contract expired after exhaustion of Act's procedures and hence supplemental letter of understanding had also expired).
.6 359 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
6244 CCH Lab. Cas. 17,460 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). Compare, NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388
U.S. 26 (1967).
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that striking workers could not be deprived of grievance machinery concerning any disciplinary action taken by the carrier. The distinction between the two cases is that FEIA was no longer the certified representative
at Eastern, but ALPA was the bargaining representative at Southern, and
the carrier, therefore, was still under a duty to treat with ALPA."'
Further, agreements have been held to survive when the carrier lost its
MATS contracts and had to close down indefinitely. " Similarly, agreements probably survive a merger, " but where two different unions (one
on the survivor and one on the merging carrier) represent the same craft
or class, the agreement of the survivor with its union controls, at least
until the NMB settles the question of which of the two unions is entitled to represent the group of employees.' s
While the Act does not specifically require written agreements, it does
require that the carrier file copies of all its agreements with its employees
with the NMB.' 7 The NMB has interpreted this to mean that contracts
a carrier and employees negotiated under the Act must be writbetween
88
ten.
Once an agreement is consummated, there is a moritorium on change
during its term."' This moritorium may also apply to "established working conditions" not embodied in the contract.' ° If the Sixth Circuit's construction in the Detroit case is correct, the union can effectively preclude
the carrier from exercising any right reserved under the contract by omission or system board construction by the mere expendient of filing a
'Compare United States Gypsum Co. v. Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding
that duty to arbitrate with union survived merger of company and also survived decertification of
union) with FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 359 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (no duty to establish
system board). See also Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 331 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 933 (1964) (duty to establish system board even though carrier had previously ceased
operation, since union was still certified representative).
114Aaxico Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, Civil No. 2996, W.D. Tex., 9 March 1965 (supplemental
opinion), aff'd per curiam, 358 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
...See Monroe Sander Corp. v. Livingston, 377 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1967); McGurie v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1966); Steel Workers v. Reliance Universal, 335 F.2d 91
(3d Cir. 1964); and Wackenhut v. Plant Guards, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964) (all arising under
NLRA). Compare Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Draftsmen's Ass'n, 393 F.2d 407 (1st Cir. 1968)
(holding that non-survivor's contract controls over survivors).
.. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. United Air Lines, Inc., 325 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1963).
cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 26 (1964). Compare Bath Iron Works v. Draftsmen's Ass'n, 393 F.2d
407 (ist Cir. 1968). See cases cited note 165, supra.
167RLA § 2, First, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 48 Stat. 1168, 45 U.S.C. § 152, First (1964).
1a5NMB, FIFTEEN YEARS UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT 10 (1950).
169Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Akron & B.B.R.R., 65 L.R.R.M. 2229, 2237 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (5 6 notice must indicate proposed effective date after current agreement expires, but bargaining can be invoked prior to expiration date for change, to become effective on or after such
date); Long Island R.R. v. System Fed'n No. 156, 63 L.R.R.M. 2378 (2d Cir. 1966); Illinois
Cent. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 69 L.R.R.M. 2616 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (question of
whether moritorium clause precludes § 6 notice presents minor dispute); Northwest Airlines, Inc.
6 Av. Cas. 17,835, 17,836 (D. Minn. 1959) (dicta).
v. IAM,
1
.See Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen, 69 L.R.R.M. 2443 (6th Cir.
1968). But see, Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U.S. 386, 402-03 (1942); Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Firemen, 332 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1964); St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry.
v. Railroad Yardmasters, 328 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1964); Norfolk & P.B.L.R.R. v. Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34, 41 (4th Cir." 1957); FEIA v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 43 CCH
Lab. Cas. 17,064, 7 Av. Cas. 17,500 (S.D. Cal. 1961). Cf. Itasca Lodge 2020 v. Railway Express
Agency, 67 L.R.R.M. 2884 (8th Cir. 1968) (whether certain action allowed under 1967 agreement with parent union and effect of such agreement on 1966 memorandum of understanding between carrier and Local Lodge presents minor dispute).
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section 6 notice. This achieves a result somewhat similar to the doctrine
developed under the NLRA, requiring a company to notify and bargain
with a union prior to instituting any unilateral action not expressly covered in negotiations or allowed by the contract or on which the union
has not clearly waived its right to bargain. " ' This does not of course
prevent disputes from arising as to whether the conduct in question is
covered, in violation of or permitted by the agreement, or whether the
conduct constitutes an unlawful unilateral change in the terms of the
agreement. This is substantially similar to the doctrine developed under
the NLRA, holding that there is no duty to bargain after an agreement
is reached on subject matters covered by the agreement, but there is a
duty to bargain on subject matters not negotiated or covered or contemplated by the agreement. 7 ' It should be noted that unlike the NLRA an
agreement under the RLA survives changes in bargaining representatives'1
D. Subjects Of Bargaining
Here, more than in any other area, the Railway Labor Act and the
NLRA are substantially similar. The RLA establishes certain guidelines
for the parties to follow in their negotiations in establishing or changing
an agreement. There is a duty to bargain about matters "concerning rates
of pay, rules and working conditions,' 7 4 and about union security and
check-off agreements.'" Further, in the airline industry, the RLA requires
the establishment of a system board of adjustment,' but does not define
its jurisdiction except in terms of its maximum authority-not to exceed
that of the National Railroad Adjustment Board.
Aside from these general guidelines, the RLA is silent on the subject
of bargaining. There is no agency such an the NRLB to which the parties
may turn to determine bargainability; thus, the courts have assumed responsibility for determining whether a subject is bargainable."' However,
the Supreme Court, in delineating the extent of this power, has stated: '
The Railway Labor Act, like the National Labor Relations Act, does not
undertake governmental regulations of wages, hours or working conditions.
Instead, it seeks to provide a means by which agreement may be reached
with respect to them. The national interest expressed by these Acts is not
primarily in the working conditions as such. So far as the Act itself is
concerned these conditions may be as bad as the employees will tolerate or
be as good as they will bargain for. The Act does not fix and does not
authorize anyone to fix generally applicable standards for working conditions.
171See text accompanying notes 92-97, supra.
172See Part III, B, text accompanying notes 92-97, supra.

"' See, e.g., Long Island R.R. v. Local Union 808, Teamsters, 67 L.R.R.M.
2463 (E.D.N.Y.
1967); Railway Express Agency v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S.Clerks, 64 L.R.R.M. 2737 (S.D.N.Y.

1967). Compare, Ludlow Typograph

Co., 113 N.L.R.B.

724

(1955);

American

Seating Co.,

106

N.L.R.B. 250 (1953); Modine Mfg. Co. v. 1AM, 216 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1954); Kenin v. Warner
Bros. 4Pictures, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
1" RLA, § 2, First, 44 Stat. 577, asamended, 48 Stat. 1168, 45 U.S.C. § 152, First (1964).
7
1 'RLA, § 2, Eleventh, 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1964).
'77RLA, § 204, 49 Stat. 1189, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1964).
...See, e.g., Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
178Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6 (1943). See also
Brotherhood of Loco. Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1963).
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The Court in Telegraphers indicated that determination of the proper
subjects of bargaining should be left to the parties. 79 Even more importantly, the Court stated that "the right of the representatives of the unit
[is] to be consulted and to bargain about the exceptional as well as the
routine rates, rules and working conditions...... Further, the Court concluded:
In an effort to prevent a disruption and stoppage of
trend of legislation . . . has been to broaden, not
which workers and railroads may or must negotiate
Furthermore, the whole idea of what is bargainable
by the practices and customs . . . [of the parties]."'

interstate commerce, the
narrow, the scope about
and bargain collectively.
has been greatly affected

While this statement involved the railroads, its language would seem equally
applicable to the airlines.' s
Thus, the subject of bargaining under the RLA are initially for the
parties to resolve, and only in exceptional cases will the courts intervene.
And, as under the NLRA, the trend is to require bargaining if the subject
bears any slight relationship to "rates of pay, rules or working conditions."
Unlike the situation which exists under the NLRA, there are relatively
few cases in which courts have considered and decided whether a particular
subject falls within "rates of pay, rules or working conditions." Of course,
a subject does not have to be specifically mentioned in the Act to be
bargainable."' Subjects which have been held to be within the bargainable
category include: management right to make changes affecting working
conditions;' " type of qualifications required for a particular position;"h
seniority rights after a merger;"' seniority rights of replacements for
strikers;"7. grounds for discharge; " ' extent of right to discipline strikers; '
'"Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960). This is an
affirmance of the statement made in Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 545
(1937):
The statute does not undertake to compel agreement . .. , but it does command these
preliminary steps without which no agreement can be reached. It at least requires
the employer to met and confer with the authorized representative of its employees,
• . . to make reasonable efforts to compose differences-in short, to enter into negotiation for the settlement of labor disputes such as contemplated by § 2, First.
"0°362 U.S. at 347.
181 Id. at 338. See also, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 383 F.2d 225, 66
L.R.R.M. 2115 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
"'Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817
(1964).
8
1 3Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 302 F.2d 540, 543-44 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962).
4
'S Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. IAM, 185 F. Supp. 129 (D. Minn. 1960). See also Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
l'Pan
American World Airways, Inc. v. FEIA, 7 Av. Cas. 18,331 (2d Cir. 1962) (issue of
whether flight engineers must have mechanics' certificate is bargainable). Contra, FEIA v. Western
Airlines, Inc., 7 Av. Cas. 17,500 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
.s O'Donnell v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 200 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1953).
s FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
.. Farris v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Wash. 1953).
9
'1 ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., 49 L.R.R.M. 3145 (M.D; Tenn. 1962). The same holding
was made in this case by the CAB, 36 C.A.B. 430 (1962). See Note, 33 J. Ant L. & CoM. 334
(1967).
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purchase and maintenance of uniforms; 0 pension plans;' compulsory retirement; 2 check-off agreements for union dues;"' job security;"' safe
conditions at work;"'a rescheduling of train runs; sub-contracting out of
work formerly performed by employees;.. and leasing out of facilities
formerly operated by employees.9 The subjects of physical fitness and
examinations have also been held to be within the Act on the theory that
'; 9
it is "of vital concern to the employer, fellow-employees, and the public. "
Generally, any change in the existing incidents of employment is a proper
subject for bargaining."00 However, the right to bargain collectively on
any particular subject cannot contravene regulations dealing with air safety
promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration. In case of conflict,
the FAA regulation is controlling.'
Further, the parties seemingly cannot by agreement limit or condition
a right granted in the Act. In Felter v. Southern Pac. Co.' the Supreme
Court held that a union and the carrier could not by agreement impose
requirements over and above those in the Act in regard to the manner of
revoking an authorization for the check-off of union dues. Such a provision was held in violation of the Act and therefore void.'
The subjects of bargaining under the RLA and NLRA seem to be substantially the same. Although the Seventh Circuit in Inland Steel v.
NLRB 9 indicated the subjects of bargaining under the LMRA are broader
than those under the RLA, this seems to be a minority view. The Supreme
Court in Steelev. Louisville &q N.R.R.' 9 referred to the duty to bargain
under the acts as "like provisions." The Tenth Circuit has stated that the
provisions of the two acts were intended to include substantially the same
190 United Air Lines, Inc. v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 28 Cal. Rptr. 238

(1963).

'91 Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 302 F.2d 540 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 823 (1962).
"'McMullans v. Kansas, 0. & G. Ry., 229 F.2d 50 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 918
(1956).
19S Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817
(1964).
194 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
i""Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 302 F.2d 540 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 823 (1962).
199 Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of Loco. Eng'rs, 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962).
1962).
107KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines v. TWU, 7 Av. Cas. 18,428" (E.D.N.Y.
...United Industrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183 (5th
Cir. 1965).
v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry., 268 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tex. 1954).
'Wilburn
.. 'See Norfolk & P.B.L.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34 (4th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958); Rutland Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 307 F.2d 21
(2d Cir. 1962). The requirements of bargaining are expanding under the RLA, as shown by the
overruling of earlier cases holding a large area exempt from bargaining as "management prerogative."
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960). The NLRB and courts
have similarly expanded the concept under the NLRA. See Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 369
F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1966) (price of coffee in company cafeteria bargainable).
01 ALPA v. Quesada, 286 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961). Cf. American
Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 6 Av. Cas. 18,083 (N.D. Il1. 1960) (strike threat enjoined where reason
was FAA Regulation required that pilot's seat be used by FAA Inspector for en-route inspection).
202359 U.S. 326 (1959).
03 The RLA, in section 2, Eleventh, provides that an employee may revoke an authorization
by putting it in writing. The parties had established a form and procedure in the agreement for
this purpose.
960 (1949).
204 170 F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
'0s 3 2 3 U.S. 192 (1944).
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subjects."' The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp."'
lends support to the Tenth Circuit's construction by pointing out that
certain of the provisions of the LMRA were derived from, and are comparable to, those of the RLA. Further support is found in the Court's
opinion in NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co.' wherein the Court indicated that the two acts were similar; while citing the Terminal R.R. Ass'n
case,"' the Court talked in terms of section 8 (d) of the NLRA. In Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB21° the Court equated "working conditions"
with "terms and conditions of employment," thus indicating that little
distinction exists between the acts as to subjects of bargaining. The court
in Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Atlantic C.L.R.R. 1' followed NLRA
precedents in finding a carrier guilty of a failure to bargain. Other courts
hearing cases under the RLA have relied on NLRA precedents to hold
that management rights are a proper subject of bargaining;... that checkoff of union dues is proper; 21 and that seniority for replacement workers
and the right to discipline strikers are proper subjects.21 ' Conversely, the
Supreme Court has relied on RLA precedents to hold that management
must bargain with a union over contracting out of work previously performed by employees of the company, i.e., that this was a mandatory
subject of bargaining. 12
There is, however, one major point of difference in the treatment of
subjects. of bargaining between the two acts. Under the NLRA, the courts
have developed the "mandatory/permissive/illegal" dichotomy when describing subjects of bargaining. 1' While some courts have used these terms
with reference to the Railway Labor Act, 17 the dichotomy does not seem
appropriate to the RLA.
In the first place, under the NLRA the import of the dichotomy is that
the parties may reach impasse on mandatory subjects, but must withdraw
200 McMullans v. Kansas, 0. & G. Ry., 229 F.2d 50, 55 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 918

(1956). See alsoManning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 817 (1964) (holding dues check-off to be subject of bargaining by analogy to cases under
NLRA); United R.R. Operating Crafts v. Wyer, 115 F. Supp. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
205
F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1953), cert.denied, 347 U.S. 929 (1954).
20'301 U.S. 1, 33-34, 43-49 (1937).
208 343 U.S. 395, 397 n.3 (1952).
20'Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1 (1943).
210 379 U.S. 203 (1964). The equation was made by citing the Telegraphers case, 362. U.S. 330
(1960), for the statement: "The subject matter of the present dispute is well within the literal
meaning of the phrase 'terms and conditions of employment.' " Id. at 210.
21 201 F.2d 36 (4th Cir.), cert.denied, 345 U.S. 992 (1953).
21aNorfolk, P.B.L.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34 (4th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958), citing NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952);
United Industrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183, 190-91 (5th
Cir. 1965), citing
Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
2
"Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 329 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817
(1964),
citingSwitchmen's Union v. Southern Pacific Co., 253 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1957).
214
ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., 49 L.R.R.M. 3145 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
212 Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964)
(relying on Telegraphers). See also
Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, enf'd, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963) (relying on
Telegraphers).
"'NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
217 See, e.g., Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 302 F.2d 540 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 823 (1962).
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permissive subjects before impasse is reached. 1 Insisting to the point of
impasse that a permissive subject of bargaining be included in the contract is an unfair labor practice. 1" Of course, no duty exists to bargain at
2°
all on a subject that is illegal under either the NLRA or the RLA.
In the second place, there is no "unfair labor practice" under the Railway Labor Act, but rather only an order from a court either compelling
bargaining or declaring that no duty to bargain exists. There are no "mandatory" or "permissive" subjects under the RLA, but rather there are
"bargainable" subjects, relating to changes in rates of pay, rules, working
conditions,"' and unlawful subjects, such as trying to force an employer
2
to bargain with other companies about job security for its employees."
Under the RLA it may possibly be that any subject is bargainable, regardless of whether it would be a mandatory or permissive subject under the
NLRA, if it has an effect on rates of pay, rules, or working conditionsunless it is unlawful, i.e., contrary to FAA safety regulations or in contravention of some duty imposed by the RLA,2 or on a subject outside
the realm of employer/employee relations."2 The sole question under the
RLA seems to be whether the subject in dispute is unlawful, or whether
it bears the necessary relation to rates of pay, rules, and working conditions. If such relationship exists, an impasse may be reached, i.e., there is
a proper subject of bargaining. As indicated by the Supreme Court in the
Telegraphers case, " - the tendency has been to broaden the scope of bargainability.
A like trend is noticeable under the NLRA, with permissive subjects
becoming fewer and narrower. No case has been found under the RLA
where the courts have held a point to be subject to bargaining under section 6, but restricted the scope of bargaining so as to require withdrawal
as would be the case with a permissive subject under the NLRA.
To superimpose the mandatory/permissive language of the NLRA cases
on those involving the RLA is to create unnecessary confusion. Under
the RLA there is no duty to bargain on an unlawful subject. Under the
NLRA there is no duty to bargain on a permissive subject, and also a
duty to withdraw that subject before impasse is reached. To the extent that
"unlawful" equates with "illegal" under the NLRA, the two acts are the
same-there is no duty to bargain. However, to the extent that "unlawful" includes "permissive" or to the extent that a bargainable subject under
the RLA includes "permissive," the acts are contrary. No cases have been
found under the RLA declaring a subject unlawful because it is a permissive subject under the NLRA, and no case has been found declaring a
218 See, e.g., NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); NLRB v. Wooster Div.
of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
219Id.
220 id.
222 See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 362 U.S. 330, 336, 338-40 (1960).
22' Pullman Co. v. Order of Ry. Conductors, 49 L.R.R.M. 3162 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
2 3 See, e.g., Felter v. Southern Pac. Co., 359 U.S. 326 (1959); Southern Pac. Co. v. Switchmen's

Union, 356 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1965).
224 Pullman Co. v. Order of Ry. Conductors, 49 L.R.R.M. 3162 (N.D. II1. 1962).
223362 U.S. 330 (1960).
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subject bargainable because it was permissive under the NLRA. Thus, it
would seem that the question of whether a permissive subject under the
NLRA was a proper or improper subject under the RLA is still open.
Because under both acts the trend has been to broaden the scope of
bargainable subjects, it would seem likely that permissive subjects are
within the meaning of rates of pay, rules, and working conditions under
the Railway Labor Act.
This broadening trend of bargainability is easily seen in the area of the
so-called "management prerogative." Earlier cases had treated a unilateral
change in business by management affecting working conditions as a management right and not a change in working conditions subject to bargaining.' " The theory of these cases was that management did not have to bargain over changes in something "subject to its continuing authority to
supervise and direct the manner of rendition of . . . [an employee's] service.. 27 In Railroad Trainmen v. New York Cent. R.R.M the court held that
a strike over the closing of train yards at Toledo could be enjoined since the
agreement did not prevent it, and management had a right to make the
change. The court reasoned that since there was not a provision in the
agreement, the dispute was not "minor"; since there had been no section 6
notice filed for changing the agreement, it was not "major." Hence, it was
not a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and
could be enjoined.
The Supreme Court in the Telegraphers case has seemingly abolished
the so-called management prerogative area of non-bargainability. In reversing the Seventh Circuit, 2 ' which had granted the railroad an injunction to stop a strike over its refusal to bargain on a proposed amendment
to the agreement which would have required negotiation over job abolition,
the Supreme Court held that such a proposal was a proper subject, as job
abolition has an effect on rates of pay, rules, and working conditions. The
railroad had contended that its decision to do away with one-man stations
was a management right and was, therefore, not a proper subject of bargaining. The Supreme Court flatly rejected this contention, holding that
such a decision had an effect on working conditions and was therefore a
proper subject.'

E. Requirement Of Good Faith
Although the Railway Labor Act does not require that agreement be
reached by the parties, "it does command those preliminary steps without
which no agreement can be reached. It at least requires the employer to
meet and confer with the authorized representative of its employees, to
listen to their complaints, to make reasonable effort to compose differences
221See, e.g., Robertson v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 18 CCH Lab. Cas. 65,693 (D.D.C. 1950)

(change

in home terminal for certain employees).
227 Wisehart, The Airlines' Recent Experience Under the Railway Labor Act, 25 L. & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 22, 30 (1960).
228246 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 877 (1958).
229264 F.2d 254 (7th Cir.), reV/d, 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
.a See also United Industrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183
(5th Cir. 1965).
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-in short, to enter into a negotiation for the settlement of labor disputes
such as is contemplated by § 2, First."' ' That section of the RLA requires
the parties to "exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions." ' Because
this is a duty imposed by the Act, it is judicially enforceable," that is,
failure to bargain in good faith is failure to comply with the Act and is
enjoinable.' The duty, of course, exists on both sides.23 "Empty motions
and hollow gestures are not enough, ''as and thus, as under the NLRA,
good faith exhaustion of negotiation is required." A flat refusal to bargain
constitutes lack of good faith,' as does a failure to comply with the section 6 procedures.a Such action entitles the aggrieved party to an injunction, 240 or prevents the party refusing to bargain from obtaining judicial
231 Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 548 (1937). The duty to bargain
runs only to the "authorized representative" and hence, there is the "negative duty to treat with
no other." Where there are two unions fighting for representation rights, one currently certified,
the courts have seemingly adopted the NLRB's Midwest Piping doctrine, 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945),
to the effect that if the company negotiates with one of the two unions, it does so at the peril of
being found guilty of an unfair labor practice if the union it chose to negotiate with was not in
fact the majority representative. See Shea Chemical Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1958); St. Louis
Ind. Packing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 291 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1961). This was the result reached in
Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Teamsters, 66 L.R.R.M. 2559 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (citing
Ruby v. American Airlines, Inc., 323 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1963); FEIA, EAL Chap. v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 311 F.2d 745 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 924 (1963) for the proposition
that the courts could not compel a carrier to bargain with one of two disputing unions where
there was a "substantial representation dispute" which, under the Act, is for exclusive determination
by the NMB) where the court held it did have jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment on
the duty of the carrier to bargain, although not to determine which union was the proper representative. Compare Long Island R.R. v. Local 808, Teamsters, 67 L.R.R.M. 2463 (E.D.N.Y. 1967)
wherein the court held the carrier was entitled to an injunction to prevent a strike by the Teamsterswho had been certified on 20 January 1967 as the bargaining representative. The Teamsters
Union was threatening to strike because of the carrier refusing to bargain with it, having entered
into an agreement with the predecessor union on 13 January 1967, which was after the election
had been held and before certification. The NMB had ruled the contract valid and binding. See
cases cited in note 173, supra. Compare the result reached here with the NLRB's contract-bar doctrine. Delux Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958). Of course an NLRB determination
a contract bar, Food Machinery Corp., 36 N.L.R.B. 491, 493 n.3 (1941), but a contract held
not to be contract bar may be valid and binding on the newly certified union, at least where it
was the incumbent. Kroger Co., 165 N.L.R.B. No. 131 (1967).
232 "This duty is not merely perfunctory. Good faith exhaustion of the possibility of agreement
is required to fulfill it." Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 721 n.12 (1945). See also
American Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 169 F. Supp. 777, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Akron & B.B.R.R., 65 L.R.R.M. 2229, 2237-44 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Brotherhood of
Loco. Firemen v. Bangor & A.R.R., 65 L.R.R.M. 2995, 3000 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (on rehearing)
("Ultimatums do not constitute negotiations and it is necessary for the parties when meeting at
a conference to discuss and argue the merits of various proposals. It is bad faith to decline to
argue the merits or to refuse to entertain or discuss a counter proposal . . . [T]he Act does not
compel . . . a concession and all that is required is that parties enter into a sincere, genuine discussion to consider . . . [proposals and counter-proposals] and finally if convinced to make such
concessions as may be deemed appropriate.").
'"See Part II, supra, and cases cited note 232, supra.
4
"" American Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 169 F. Supp. 777, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
" Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 185 F. Supp. 350
(E.D.N.Y. 1960).
2 Id. at 357, comparing decisions under NLRA.
"sLong Island R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 185 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
.. Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
2 30
KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines v. TWU, 8 Av. Cas. 18,395 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (refusal by
union to continue negotiations under existing section 6 notice and striking to force the carrier to
bargain over subcontracting of work which was not covered by "openers.").
.40Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines
v. TWU, 8 Av. Cas. 18,395 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 3 5

relief from counter measures by the aggrieved party, i.e., a strike.24' However, action which will bar a party from obtaining an injunction is not
necessarily a refusal to bargain in good faith under the Act. '
There are many cases in which the allegation by one or the other of
the parties of lack of good faith bargaining has been raised,4 3 but very
few cases have given a detailed analysis of the factors involved in constituting good faith or its lack, beyond the broad categories of refusal to
bargain. Where an allegation is made with some basis, courts have entered
temporary restraining orders pending a hearing on the merits.' "
Beyond the obvious violations, such as a refusal to negotiate, which can
be considered to constitute "per se" violation of the duty to bargain in
good faith,"4 the courts under the RLA have not developed to any great
extent standards or indicia of bad faith, as have been developed by the
NLRB and the courts under the NLRA. The burden of proof seems to
be on the party asserting bad faith to prove the allegation by a "clear and
convincing showing that the union has failed to comply. . . ,,2" The basic
test seemingly used by the courts in determining good faith, or lack
thereof, is "totality of circumstances"-whether, after an examination of
the entire conduct surrounding a dispute, it can be said that the conduct
violated the requirements of the Act "to exert every reasonable effort to
make and maintain agreements. 2 7 This is, of course, a factual question,
and necessitates an examination of the dispute by the court." As stated in
American Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA:
"The question [of good faith] . . .
is one of subjective intent, to be determined by the facts and circumstances." The few cases which have discussed the requirements of good
faith have relied heavily on NLRA precedents. As noted in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. the duty to bargain in both acts are "like provisions."
241

Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 7 Av. Cas. 18,428

(E.D.N.Y. 1962).
242 Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 302 F.2d 540 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 823 (1962).
243 See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 185 F. Supp. 77 (D. Minn. 1960).
244 Long Island R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 185 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1960);
Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 185 F. Supp. 350
(E.D.N.Y. 1960); American Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 169 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
245 See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
.4 American Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 169 F. Supp. 777, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See also Chicago,
R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1961).
.47Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's Union, 292 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1961); American
Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 169 F. Supp. 777, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
141 Id. See also Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. TWU, 7 Av. Cas. 18,428 (E.D.N.Y.
1962); FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 8 Av. Cas. 17,149 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 8 Av. Cas.
17,424 (2d Cir. 1963); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks,
185 F. Supp. 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). "What constitutes good faith bargaining . . . is colored by
how all parties have actually bargained in the past." Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic
C.L.R.R., 383 F.2d 225, 66 L.R.R.M. 2115, 2119 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The court in this case examined the historical background of how the parties had bargained in the past and determined
that national handling of the crew consist issue on the railroads was not mandatory, i.e., that
good-faith bargaining did not require it. Compare the doctrine of multi-employer/multi-union
negotiations established under the NLRA, to wit: That such negotiations are dependent upon the
mutual consent of all parties to both sides and that either side can withdraw from such arrangement unilaterally if timely notice of such withdrawal is given. See, e.g., Evening News Ass'n, 154
N.L.R.B. 1494 (1965), enf'd sub nom., Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d
569 (6th Cir. 1967).
249 169 F. Supp. at 793.
20 323 U.S. 192, 200 (1944). See also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R.,
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And in Brotherhood of Ry. d3 S.S. Clerks v. Atlantic C.L.R.R. " the court
relied heavily on NLRA precedents to find the carrier guilty of a refusal
to bargain in good faith. In Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Switchmen's
Union," the court held that the fact that the bargaining representative
conducting the negotiations did not have the authority to enter into a binding agreement was not in and of itself bad faith, but was "a factor which
should be taken into consideration in order to decide whether the . . .
effort to negotiate was really made, in good faith. . . ." Further the court
went on to state that it was not bad faith for a representative of either party
to report a proposal as the best obtainable without resort to strike or lockout, but still as something they did not recommend. The court also found
from examination of the facts that the union's representative had not
stood pat on the union's original demand, but had tried to find an alternative which tended to show a good faith endeavor. The court stated that
the parties had satisfied the test of section 8 (d) of the NLRA, and assuming that the RLA imposed a greater duty to endeavor to reach agreement,
the Act did not require either side to abandon all efforts toward their respective objectives. The court therefore held that the carrier had failed
to make the necessary showing of bad faith.
In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. TWU... the court held that
a carrier which invoked NMB mediation before it had reasonable grounds
to believe negotiations would not result in agreement acted in bad faith.
Also, the carrier had limited negotiations to a narrower spectrum than
that covered by the section 6 notices; and this was an act of bad faith.
However, a carrier can urge a proposal as a means of settlement and such
action does not constitute bad faith, but if the carrier sets the proposal
as a condition to settlement, such action would then constitute bad
faith." ' The courts apparently look to the prior bargaining conduct
between the parties, at least insofar as it relates to the present charge of
bad faith. In FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc." the court relied on Eastern's
past refusals to accede to the demands of ALPA which would have encroached on FEIA's domain as an indication of the carrier's good faith
with FEIA. (The carrier had proposed a merger of the two unions as a
solution to the crew complement issue, and FEIA had charged that the
carrier was imposing the proposal as a condition to settlement.)
In contrast to the FEIA case above, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
held, in applying the RLA, that a carrier's refusal to withdraw a subject
(super-seniority of replacement workers) found to be discriminatory and
unreasonable, was a failure to bargain in good faith."' The CAB relied
heavily on NLRA precedents in this area in reaching its determination.
321 U.S. 50 (1944); Norfold, P.B.L.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 248 F.2d 34, 45 n.6
(4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958).
25'201 F.2d 36 (4th Cir.),cert. denied, 345 U.S. 992 (1953).
252292 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1961).
2537 Av. Cas. 18,428 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
2 4
5 FEIA v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 8 Av. Cas. 17,149 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 8 Av. Cas.
17,424 (2d Cir. 1963).
255
Id.
23
5 ALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc.,36 C.A.B. 430 (1962).
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The case is rather unique since a federal district court 5 had, in a separate
action, held there was no failure to bargain in good faith. Both the court
and the CAB held the carrier's (Southern Airways) refusal to submit
striking pilot's grievances to a system board violated section 204 and was
illegal per se. Both also recognized the right of the carrier to hire replacements to continue business, but the CAB found the carrier's insistence on
super-seniority for replacements was discriminatory and unreasonable and
hence was a refusal to bargain in good faith. In reaching its conclusion
the Board relied heavily on NLRA precedents and made an exhaustive
analysis of these cases. '" The court on the other hand, also relying on
NLRA precedents, held that Southern's insistence on its proposal for
striker seniority "was not, per se, a failure to bargain in good faith." The
CAB discussed, but did not rely, on the NLRB's opinion in Erie Resistor."'
It did rely, however, upon the rationale of Potluctch Forests.' Based upon
this rationale the CAB found that Southern's insistence on super-seniority
was not based upon economic motives but, rather, was punative, and
Southern's refusal to withdraw its demands constituted a failure to bargain in good faith. "The general principle is well-established that insistence
on a demand which is illegal as a condition of settlement of a dispute ...
constitutes in substance a failure to bargain in good faith. '' .. The court,
on the other hand, made a different analysis of the facts and found Southern's demands were not illegally motivated, and, further, that the impasse
was not caused by the carrier, but rather that ALPA was at fault. Hence
there was no failure to bargain in good faith.
In summary, it can be said that aside from the per se violations, such as
a refusal to negotiate or to comply with the procedures of the Act, there
is little case law defining what is required to constitute good faith compliance with the Act's mandate to "exert every reasonable effort to make
and maintain agreements." The standards would seem to be substantially
the same as those developed under the NLRA, and reliance on NLRA
precedents therefore would seem appropriate. As stated in American Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA:"s
The requirement of good faith bargaining is really a requirement of absence
of bad faith. In order to show such a lack of good faith it is necessary to
establish facts from which it can be reasonably inferred that a party enters
upon a course of bargaining and pursues it with the desire or intent not to
enter into an agreement at all.
'TALPA v. Southern Airways, Inc., 49 L.R.R.M. 3145 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). See Note, 33 J.
AIR L. & COM. 334 (1966) for a discussion of these cases.
SE.8 ., NLRB v. Mackay Radio Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); NLRB v. Potlatch Forests Co.,
189 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. California Date Growers Ass'n, 259 F.2d 587 (9th Cir.
1958).
" Erie Resistor Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 621 (1961), rev'd, 303 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1962), rev'd,
373 U.S. 221 (1963).
6
1"NLRB v. Potlatch Forests Co., 189 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1951). See also,
Olin Mathieson Chem.
Corp. v. NLRB, 232 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 352 U.S. 1020 (1957); BallasEgg Prods.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 283 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1960).
"' The CAB cited Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S.Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
(1930); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957).
...169 F. Supp. 777, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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There must be some reasonable effort in some direction to compose differences,"' and the party asserting a lack of good faith must clearly show
a wish to defeat rather than reach agreement. " The test is "whether under
all the facts and circumstances the . . . [parties] acted in good faiththat is to say with a sincere desire to reach an agreement-or whether they
faith-that is, with the affirmative intention not to reach
acted in bad
agreement." '*'

263

Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).

Compare, NLRB v. Reed &

Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 135 (1st Cir. 1954).
264American Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 169 F. Supp. 777, 794-95
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (citing:
Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941); NLRB
v. I.B.S. Mfg. Co., 210 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. United Clay Mines Corp., 219 F.2d
120, 125 (6th Cir. 1955).
" American Airlines, Inc. v. ALPA, 169 F. Supp. 777, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).

